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ABSTRACT
Huck, Christopher D., M.S., 1977

Forestry

Issues in Forest Practice Legislation (123 pp.)
Director:

Arnold W. Bolle

The study was untertaken to determine why legislation
to regulate forest management practices on private
land has failed in Montana, and what steps could "be
taken to increase its chances of adoption. A method
of comparison was used: studying the similar laws
and proposals of other governmental entities for the
purpose of ga.ining knowledge useful in Montana.
Before studying the laws themselves, the discussion
addresses tv/o basic issues of forest practice legis
lation. It identifies the political interests involved
and their a,ttitudes. And it considers the purpose and
rationale of such legislation.
Seven options were selected for study. In addition
to Montana's proposed law, the laws of California,
V/aShington, Oregon and Idaho, the Environmental Pro
tection Agencj^^'s model law and a Sediment Control
Ordinance proposal of Lewis and Clark County (Helena)
Conservation District were reviewed and briefed.
Comparison of these options revealed that the laws
could be arranged in two general categories: the
stricter ones, as represented by California's, and
the milder ones such as Oregon's. The outstanding
portions of each proposal were studied in light of
its applicability to Montana's natural and political
environment. In the course of the discussion, recom
mendations concerning new or altered provisions were
set forth.
Several broad conclusions have been made. The first
is that political opposition to forest practice legis
lation is not necessarily a function of its merits.
But nevertheless, drafters of a bill can work toward
certain goals: simplicity of language, bureaucratic
accountability, prote.ction of individual rights and
attitudes, and future flexibility.
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PREFACE

The people of Montana are blessed with over 22 million
acres of forest land, and all of the associated benefits.
Almost 90 percent of the land is classified as commercially
valuable—able to produce timber.

Virtually every acre is

rich in resources beyond timber.
There are roughly four acres of public forest land for
every one of private.

But there is only a three to two

ratio of public to private commercial forest.

It follows

that commercial forest on private lands forms a higher
percentage of the whole than on public lands.
This private forest resource is not eternal; it can
be abused.

In our state, some four million acres needed

restocking or TSI work in 1975.

Apparently, many owners

and operators are failing to use that resource up to its
potential.

To the extent their actions are damaging the

resource and society's v/elfare, the government has a re
sponsibility to guide and direct them.

This involves

social, political and legal conflicts.

This study recog

nizes those conflicts and suggests a legal soliation to
them.

V

Legislation is a construct of political compromises
aimed at solving a technical problem.

The problem must

be felt by society—in this case the citizens of Montana
—before being acted upon.

In recommending forest practice

legislation for Montana, I believe that a st^^dy of the
history and the politics of past legislation and current
proposals can be useful.
This is a study of the v/ays that people perceive a
problem and react to its solution.

It is a social study,

rather than a technical or economic one.
subjective.

As such, it is

There are no formal analytics, no list of

parameters, variables and measuring devices.

It is a study

of how different segments of society react to different
aspects and viewpoints of the same problem.
My approach is more that of a club than a scalpel.
In politics, one can seldom analyze one variable minutely
v;hile keeping the others constant.

Everything changes.
I

This study reflects the belief that a more accurate set
of recommendations can result from attacking every aspect
of the problem superficially than from looking at one
aspect, e.g. the economic effects of forest practice laws,
in every detail.
In this study, I intend to determine vrtiether legis
lation designed for us in Montana could be effective
in both protecting the resources and satisfying the
objectives of the people.

The value of my work can

vi

Toe judged in three steps: first, to what extent does my
research attack the problem areas; second, are the research
based conclusions valid; and third, do the recommendations
adequately implement the conclusions?

But the final test
*

will be in takin/r the recommendations out of the book and
into the field.

vii

PART I

THE ROLE OP GOVERNMENT IN FOREST PRACTICE REGULATION

In the first part of this study, I v/ish to explore
the philosophical issues behind forest practice regula
tion.

I believe that it is appropriate and necessary to

my case that I set out the social, economic and legal
justifications of such legislation before I begin to con
sider its legal technology.
The role of government is that of provider of goods to
its subjects and mediator of disputes among conflicting in
terests.

"Regulation of these various and interfering in

terests," wrote James Madison in the 13th Century, "forms
the principal task of modern legislation."
practice debate is no exception,

The forest

I hope to explain the

character and role of each of the involved interests in the
debate, drawing from the writings and analyses of the mem
bers of these respective interests.
Any government action will please some parties and
anger others, or fail to please all, equally.

Planning and

regulation tend to expa.nd the rights and liberties of one

2

3
group (e.g. amenity users) while restricting another's (e.g.
forest operators).

Before acting, any potential planner

should seek to find out whether, and how, his action is
justified.

My own discussion of the forest practice pro-

"blem is brief, but points to a few key considerations.
One aspect of the general land use debate highlights
in exemplary•fashion both the legal and social controversy.
Discussants of the "Taking Issue," as it is called, argue to
what extent the government is justified in limiting the uses
(and thereby the value) of land without providing compensa
tion to its owner,

I found from my research that in forest

practice legislation, as with many resource issues, the
popular opinion of the issue is more to be feared than its
legal interpretation.
There are many other aspects to the problem which should
be considered were it not for time and space limitations.
The reader sho^^ld consider these three discussions as a
cursory review of the field of legal philosophy, not as a
comprehensive justification of the forest practice laws.

CHAPTER ONE
INTERESTS AND CONFLICT
The first step to policy-making should be an identi
fication and an understanding of the interests involved.
Each group has its own viev/ of the problem/solution.
Lawmakers assume that their objective is to maximize
the sum of benefits to these groups.1*

They carefully weigh

the input of these groups, their testimony of gain or loss.
And "net social benefit" need not be a monetary measure; the'
economic assijmption that each individual tries to maximize
his own welfare extends to \mvalued satisfactions as well.
r

Forest management, as a form of land use', is a good

[example.

The "highest and best use" that the forest land

assessor sees is not always the landowner's— simply because
; not all of his value lies in monetary returns,
\
Land resources are at their highest and best
\ use when they are used in such a manner as to pro\ vide an optimum return to their operators or to
\ society. Depending on the criteria used, this re\ turn may be measured in strictly monetary terms,
\ in intangible and socia.l values, or in some com\ bination of these values. £/

\
* Notes to the text are numbered and collected by Part,
and appear at the close of each.

4
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Whose values are influenced by a forest practice policy?
The landovvners cited above are but one group.

Timber oper

ators, who deiDend on the forest for their livlihood, are
another.

Foresters, representing both the need for forest

products and for protection of the environment, are a third.
And the community at large, the "public," anomic and diffuse
nevertheless has its own values.
Large landowners
I have classified forest landowners into tv/o groups:
the large owners, chiefly represented by corporate owner
ships, and small ones, of whom most are individuals or fam
ilies.^

But, though I am constrained by the research

others to categorize owners by the size of holding, I feel
strongly that the more important difference is in the objec
tives of the owner.

r

Large tracts of land generally signify some conscious
capital investment.

It is with this assumption that most

authorities state that large landowners seek monetary econ
omic benefit from their land.

Either the land produces a

regular crop of timber or it is held for speculation, high
: intensity recreation or some similar use.

Forest lands in

! this state are generally of better than average site quality,
i

V

V,

'ell-managed and readily bought under intensive management.

(President's Advisory Panel on Timber and the Environment,
(PAPTE) 1973).
r

The objective of the large forest landowner may be
summarized (v/ith some simplification) in a v/ord: profit.

6
As opposed to piiblic ownerships and small landowners, whose
investment lies elsewhere, the survival of the industrial
forest enterprise depends on its ability to make money.
Corporations have, in theory, an infinite life; there
fore they have an indefinite planning horizon.
I ideally suited to the grov/ing of trees.

This is

An individual lacks

sufficient time-preference to value the future growth of an
80 yeg.r crop.

The corporation, with its indefinite planning

horizon and a continually prodizcing unit, can visualize its

I
^income as a rate of return instead of a lump sum.
Industrial owners, contrary to some popular thought,
have a strong economic interest in protection of the envir
onment; the days of "cut out and get out" are over.

The
f

future income of the factory depends on its present maintenence,
As economic entities, industries follow the policies
most efficient in producing the product,

Crovernment regu

lation, particularly added restrictions on sound management
practices (notice of harvests, for example) reduces costeffectiveness of its policies and creates a burden,. Though
most industrial owners genuinely favor protection of the
growing environment "recent overzealous attempts by the
public to regulate forest practices threaten to impose con
straints beyond those needed to assure rapid growth of new
timber crops."

Such regulation can be a disincentive to good forest
practices by imposing additional, unnecessary costs.

It

will raise the manager's level of uncertainty (by causing
him to operate closer to the margin), reduce the market
supply of products and reallocate human and natural resources
The industrial land mana.ger naturally favors the forest
practice policy which imposes the least cost on his operation
The forest industry has taken the initiative in pro
moting good forestry and thus its own welfare."

Associations

of forest products firms aggressively promote good forest
planning and practice, both nationally and locally. 5
Industrial foresters and the SAP joined forces in re
sponse to public demands in V/est Virginia to draw up volun
tary standards. (Paxton, 1973)

In Mississippi, industry

didn't wait for public outcry; they adopted their own guides
in 1973. (Siegal, 1974)

In Washington, one company, stating

a "permanent policy of buying pulp logs from neighboring
. . . woodland owners" outlined in a series of pamphlets
good forest practices for every region of the state. (Crown
Zellerbach, undated)
In Montana, the Western Wood Products Association,
outlining its members' efforts to "eliminate the environ
mental problems it helps to create," notes policies designed
to recognize the non-monetary values of the forest.^ (State
of Montana, 1972)

One of these policies, concerning roEi.d

building, was quoted as follov;s:

8
Roads shall be planned, located and constructed
to provide a minim\.im disturbance of the land for
the standard required. They shall be designed and
„
constructed to minimize erosion and stream siltation.
Summarising, the forest products industry — the large
landowner — har: become one of the foremost proponents of
good land management practices.

V/hile they would prefer

self-regulation, and probably fight strict controls by the
state, they have supported and helped to draft legislation,
including Montana's, to set standards for good forestry.
Small landowners
A small woodland generally consists of less than 5,000
acres, though one source limits it to 2,500. (Prutchey, 1965)
But the importance of the division is not in acreage, but
' purpose of ownership.

Small ownerships vary in site char-

'acteristics, size of holding, ownership objectives and other
factors. (PAPTE, 1973)

But the dominant characteristic of

small forest owners is that the forest is not their primary
^ •

8

source of income.
I
I

The status of a private v/oodland is almost always the

I reflection

of its owner's goals.

Groups may buy land for

open space, individuals for supplemiental income or personal
enjoyment.

Farmers may keep the property as a hedge against

junexpected debts or as a supply of posts, firewood and
I
Icreek water.
^

Small ov/ners practice "personal economics." 9

Their

1 objectives are based not upon what will bring them the most
I
money, but Eire a function of their characteristics, those

I

9
of the tract and the social and economic situation.

On small

ownerships, in my opinion, management strategy is a function
of personal factors rather than market ones.
The study of small forest ownerships has a history all
its own, progressing from study of the property to study of
the ovmer's economic situation to study of his personal at
titudes, as researchers gradtially become more avv'are of what
actually influences owner's decisions,

Keniston (1975)

wrote that studies which relate the management- status of

I the unit to property characteristics assume that every owner
i wants to maximize his timber production.

Industry, he said,

j will r\in true to economics of the firm, but a private landI owner runs on attitudes and motivation.
V

In Montana, private holdings both large and small are
confined to the bottomlands, the best growing sites.

But

these are often the best — and only — growing sites for
subdivisions and new agriculture.

These sites not only have

good timber potential, they are close to markets and easy
of access.
In Montana and the nation, small-time management stra
tegies vary to extremes,

Worrell (1975) claims that v/here

timber management is the goal, middle-class, v/ell-educated
owners generally manage their tracts v/ell and are open to
suggestions for improvement.

But, "because of size, quality

and ovmership objectives," says PAPTE, small tracts "are
unlikely to achieve the productivity levels of industrial
forests."

10
But again, v/e must look to the original objectives of
the ov.'ners.
^

Some people place a high value on profits and
the maximization of monetary returns per se. Most
people, hov/ever, regard monetary returns as an in
termediate rather than a final goal. For them, money
is a means to the attainment of more ultimate ends.
. . . Recognition of this factor is important, be
cause it explains v/hy landowners frequently fail to
behave in a strictly economic manner even when it
^ight be clearly in their financial interest. 10/

There is no reason, economic or otherwise, for an owner to
put his v/oodland under management if development of the area
will produce less satisfaction thg.n he enjoys now.
Even economically inclined small forest owners can give
1 several reasons for not managing: lack of time, capital or
!

'

•

'

I

|j;echnical Itnowledge. (Frutchey, 1965)

They may feel that

the returns on their efforts are too low, or they may be
holding the land for speculation. (Anderson,. 1975)

For

farmers, forest management must compete with other farm,
responsibilities.
Small forests are a great national resource only if
managed and managed v/ell.

For the potential small forest

manager, the understanding and adoption of good management
practices may take time.

Very possibly they won't, as PAPTE

claimed, reach the productivity of large acreages.

The ease

with which these good practices are adopted depends again on
attitudes and motivation.
Persuading the economically inclined sma.ll forest owner
to, one, put his forest under management and, two, use good

11
methods, is a continuing headache for government planners.
I've limited the scope of this study to consideration of
forest practice legislation to achieve the latter objective;
most authors, though, recognize that programs of assistance
11
and group action are nearly as valuable.
(Worrell, 1975)
Both large and small forest owners have interest in
such legislation, as I have indicated.

While large ovmers

concern themselves more with profit margins, small owners
are protective of their right to do what they want v/ith
their property.

This is v/hat the government planner hears.

Forest operators
Forest operators, too, can be divided into large and
small enterprises.

But unlike some owners, every timber

operation is out to eke a living from the forest.
Many small-time operators, known as "gyppos" in Montana,
are landowners as well.

They share the "rugged individual"

image of the pioneer, the attitude that their livlihood is
their ovv'n making and should be secure from tinsolicited gov
ernmental interference.
The gyppo logger runs a marginal operation at best.
He makes his living by his skill at getting the most footage
out of the woods.

Sometimes, it is to his economic advan

tage to high-grade the stand and leave marketable but submarginal logs and trees.At other times, a simple lack
of technical knov/ledge or poor planning will produce the
same results, (see PAPTE, 1971)

When a logger goes into an

12
area too small or lightly stocked to assure a profit, bad
practices invariably result.
V/e can normally expect the bitterest opposition to
regulation from the small-time logger. (Cf. Ahner, 1974)
Not only are

adding costs to his already shoestring oper-

a.tion, he says, but we are also trying to dictate how to
conduct his ovm professionj

No one enjoys being dictated

to, particularly the individualists.
Corporate forestry is often split into both ovmership
and operation.

That which I stated regarding large forest

owners goes for 'their timber operations as well.

Large oper

ations do, for the most part, try to police themselves.
Though individuals in the operation may not follov/ company
policy, the attitude of the industry as a whole is identical
to what I outlined earlier.
Foresters
The professional forest manager is the expert.

In a

public or private capacity, he decides how to allocate the
resoiirces ujider his power to competing uses — to provid.e a
continuous supply of them without deterioration of the
".factory,"

The forester is conservationist in the original

sense of the word — ensuring preserva.tion of future options
by v/ise exercise of existing ones.
Forestry's objectives h8.ve shifted with the yestrs and
the changing scope and awareness of resource values.

A 1956

Forest Service publication offered the follov/ing: "Objective:

each forest acre growing a commercial forest product." (U.S.
Forest Service, 1956)

Since that time, foresters have grov/n

to understand that not all forest products are commercial;
not all owners want to fulfill the same objectives.
Foresters have a responsibility to maintain a timber
supp]-y only insofar as that meets the objective of the landov/ner.

Foresters are not free to direct resource use to

their ovm v/ishes; their duty is to maximize the objective
10
of the landovmer within the constraints of the" land.
Forestry is both a natural and a social science.

Good

forestry involves both good land use prs.ctices and consider
ation of the owner's overall objectives.

Good foresters

treat the natural environment and inter-act with the social
one.

One set of suggestions to extension foresters requests

that their management program fit the owner's objectives
before all else. (Prutchey, 1965)
Even on the National Forests, where the owner's objec
tives are supposedly more- rigid, foresters are using new
methods to integrate natural and social values.

Sliaping and

limiting the size of clearcuts, road construction and har
vesting suioervision are some of the measures ts^ken. (Kemper,
1976)
Because in a,ny forest policy debate the forester must
represent both the natural and social environment, his input
is critical.

Fore stern have, historically taken tlie lead in

the formation of 'land use policies in Europe and America.

14
Organizations such as the Society of American foresters
(SAP) represent foresters in policy issues.They make their
otijectives felt in the policy-making process.Their ob
jectives are, ideally, those of their clients tempered "by
the constraints of the land.
The public
^

The cominunity a,t large has a certain interest separable

from its many private intej^ests.

Clean air and water and an

! aesthetic environment are "public goods" as the economist
1 terms them.

Society, too, has an interest in supply for

I fixture generations that few individuals could personally
^laim.
Environmental groups often like to represent themselves
as spokesmen for the public.

Insofar as the .public is a

diffuse group, often with no discernable financial interest
in an issue, their claim may be valid.

But the interest at

stake is not just that of those who prefer to emphasize
amenity uses of the land; it includes present and future
needs for commercial as v/ell as non-commercial forest products.
V/e see conflict between society and the individual every
time the actions of a person in maximi/.ing his own interest
threaten the interests of the community.

Community inter

ests may be intangible; the private operator may not even
recognize them.
must

The decision-mc3,ker and the public planners

15
The social costs of forest management which the land
owner fails to heed, economists call "spillovers."

These

costs (and sometimes benefits) are evidence of the failure
of the market system to come to an allocation commensurate
with demands.

Society's interest is affected, but we have

yet to devise a scheme for market allocation.
The public decision-maker may wish to internalize these
spillovers.

Our public interest is too large and diffuse to

accurately price its values.

But the government must do so,

v/eighing what they can from the public voice alongside those
of the established economic interests.
There is no lobby, though, for the future.

Our decen-

dents are a commimity of interest without a spokesman.
At times the government plays the role of future ad
vocate,

The state is responsible, it argues, for the inter

ests of future generations.
is clear to foresters.

The importance of this concept

Because the development of a forest

lasts for generations, a forest "cannot really be owned by
one person."

17

It is owned by he and his unborn children.

The interest of the public is hard to express and eval
uate,

But its presence is clear.

In creating a forest

policy, la-w-makers must weigh the "povirer of public concern," l3
along with the interests of landowners, operators and mana
gers.

That power is yet to be felt in Montana. (Moon, 1975)

It will come, though, and bring with it a new and larger
role for government.

CHAPTER TWO

TI-IE GOVERNMENT AS REGULATOR

The role of arbiter for government brings v/ith it the
onus of regulator.

Resolving a conflict requires either

mutual agreement or imposing a solution.

More and more,

governments choose the latter option.
Historically, governments have justified their exis
tence by gu.arding the rights and v/ell-being of citizens.
But society is growing—ec.onomically, socially and intel

lectually.

"the drift of modern times" v/rites a forester

"is tov;ard increasing recognition of the public interest"
and its protection by social action. (Clark, undated)
?orest practice regulations existed in Europe in the
14th Century. (PAPTE, 1973)

But only within the past 40

years, planners in America have shown less concern for
protection of the individual welfare and more for protection
of society's.19
Barlowe (1958) suggests th8,t society has an inherent
interest in property use because 1) it was the original
grantor of rights, 2) property has economic and social
significance to society, and 3) government has a respon
sibility to maximize social welfare,

16

17
Society's interest is asserted through public planning
and implemented through regiilation.

Planning is "the con

scious direction of effort tov/ard the attainment of a rationally desirable goal."

20

But in order for any planning

to be justified, we must prove its effectiveness in achieving
our social and economic goals.
Under what conditions is social (governmental) action
justified?

My sources list several rationales.

can all be summarized in two steps.

But t'hey

Intervention in private

affairs is justifiable only if:
1)

the general welfare is not being served by the

existing situation, and
2) the proposed action would result in a significant

21
increase in general welfa,re.
We can clearly justify social action in cases of national
need or the prevention of physical harm to others.
a.

^ -

J.

*

But v/e

find it harder to do so when confronted v/ith problems in
land use and resource development.

Social values become

less distinct; the social mandate is weaker and individual
voices stronger.
This is the case in promotion of good forest practices.
Though most resource managers will agree that good forest
22

management pays off in increased social welfare,

the most

vocal opinion comes from those who pay the costs.
Nearly all increases in social welfare directly reduce
some individual freedom. (Klemperer, 1971)

The Constitution

18
and our legal tradition set out rights and freedoms of the
individual.

Though these rights are seldom fully understood,

they are heartily defended.

Forest policy, v/hen it restricts

land uses, restricts rights.

Are the social benefits of the

action worth the fight?
Weakness of the individual
The very complexity of modern society engenders one
argument in favor of intervention.

Our society is grov/ing

at a geometric rate, and with it the complexity of our re
lationships,

V/e no longer buy groceries from the local

farms and shoes from the town cobbler,
dependent to a critical degree.

V/e have grown inter

If California farmers get

a drought, fruit becomes a rarity.

If Mideastern oil pro

ducers cut off our supply, we are paralyzed.
A further product of our complex society is the super
abundance of information.

No individual can keep informed

of all the developments that affect him.

Each man's disci

pline and interests are growing, along v;ith the number of
decisions required of him.

The more that decisions require

increased data, the less able one person will be to make them.
As individuals we each make decisions, some well-informed
some not.

Each decision contributes to the problem.

We are

unaware, not only of the effects of our single decision, but
tliat one on top of our previous one, and our neighbor's and
the folks' in the next town.

This "tyranny of small deci

sions" wastes energy and resources.

The cumulative outcome

19
of these incremental decisions may be such that no decision
maker would have chosen that alternative had he known the
consequences. (iClemperer, 1971)
This weakness in our society — weakness through nec
essary dependence on others — leads to susceptability.
The oil companies are too numerous and complex.

No one

person knows whether or not they are cheating us.

And

although v/e should have an interest in forest land, we have
not the time or ability to check into it.
Government is the vehicle v/e look to, to intervene on
our behalf.

V/e, the public, cannot represent our personal

interests effectively.
perspective.

Government has a more comprehensive

So we pay it to ba,rgain for our interests.

The objective of planning, says the economist, is to
increase the efficiency of the output.

The government's

role as bargainer is far more efficient than if each of us
tried to sit down and argue for all our interests with all
those who influence them.
Costs and benefits
Ayer (1973) presents an excellent — and brief —
STjmmary of the economic rationale for regulation of private
forest management,

2

The government should act, he says,

only if the actions of a group produce externalities which
the free market cannot handle to the satisfaction of those
affected.
efficient.

Albeit, the mechanism of government should be
The costs to the state of setting up and running
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a bureaucracy to administer the program, and to the private
party, of compliance, must be balanced by the benefits.
meeting the goal worth the public a,nd private costs?

Is

If so,

the action is justified.
<.

In theory, government -programs impose on operators a
cost equivalent to the value of the external "bads" they
produce.

They now must pay for what used to be unnoticed
24.

consequences of their actions.

The logger used to ignore

the fate of his slash or roadfill.

Now the government tells

him that he v^ill have to pay more attention, work more slow
ly and carefully and perform more tasks.
In other words, the government now charges him for what
he used to do ixnobserved.

It follows that the price of

prodviction will rise and the supply will drop.

Producers

of forest products will be less well off, as will buyers.
25

But benefits to the general public will increase,

Klemperer evaluated Oregon's Forest Practice Act with
regard to its public benefits.

By summing the perceived

public benefits, he estimated a gross benefit of SlO per
forest acre from regulation.

Though Montanans do not have

I the reputation of Oregonians for valuing the environmental
amenities, we do receive the same benefits.

On state and

private lands alone our total benefit from forest practice
regulation would reach $70,000,000.
But balance that against the costs;

administration,

increased management intensity and reduced supply.

If
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the ciJinulated social costs are less than the benefits,
your law is economically justified.
Effect on operatious
(

How v^ill forest practice regulation affect the use of

I land? .On areas suitable for forestry, it v/ill intensify the
I existing forest uses. (Brock, 1975)

On the more marginal

areas and operations, usage will tend to shift away from
forestry.

On farm woodlots and other noncontinuous oper

ations, it could eliminate forestry altogether unless private
p^
^operators could be compensated for their increased costs.
A program of regulation need not shift the operators
process of decision-making.
trary management decision.

It should not cause an arbi
But, it should compel him to

internalize costs of water pollution or forest degradation,
(LeMaster, 1975a)
v;ill rise.

In most cases, the operator's total cost

Shutdown of marginal operations may result.

A ,

policy objective for foresters would ensure that those mar
ginal shutdowns which occur are those which should otherwise
fail solely beca.use of poor practices.

Such a policy would

equate submarginal operations with those practicing destruc
tive forestry.
Shortcomin;r"s of Government
Some arguments against regulation are less theoretical.
For example, the government's inability or reluctance to act
in a situation may be a ^ facto argument against its actions.
The law-making process in state and federal legislatures is
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a long and complex one.

Its very complexity ^— legislators

feel responsible to examine every aspect of a problem —
v^orks against it.

The legislature thus at times abdicates

its responsibility.
Our Montana legislature is a melting pot of ideas and
desires.

It is a "layman legislature" in its finest form.

But factors other than the simple diversity of views can
prevent the legislature from making good and timely policy
decisions.

The pressures of time (90 days every tv^o years),

span of issues and lack of staff all contribute to inade
quate appraisal of s.ny subject, from wildlife h3,bitat to
mental health.
Further, there arfe anti-government attitudes even among
legislators.

One, for example, in debating the 1975 forest

practice bill, said "if you want to give the government of
the State of Montana more authority over private land, vote
for 0;he billQ
V/hen a problem is serious enough to force action and
the legislature stands still, the responsibilities usually
devolve to the administrators.

But bureaucracy has the

reputation for taking action with little public cognizance.
Government then becomes not one "of the people" but one
of the bureaucrats.
Every new program requires a bureaucracy to make the
day-to-day decisions and the detailed policies.
argxie against the program.

Added costs

There is also the incremental
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increase in the complexity of government.

Even politicians

shrink at times from the intimidating process of bureau
cratic decision-making.
The other alternative to the legislature is the local
governmental entity.

The movement to vest more pov/er in

the local governments is gaining support.

But in Montana,

most coimty governments have shown neither the will nor the
expertise to lead new programs or take on new authority.
(Tomlinson, 1972)

County commisioners point out that some

laws and regulations designed for county implementation are
cost prohibitive in the smaller, poorer counties; they simply

\

cannot afford the time or attention required of them by nev/

Vrograms. (Montana, 1974b)
Compensation a solution?
The concept of pareto-optimality states that a society
is ma,king most efficient use of its resources if no one can
be made better off without another becoming worse off,

A

corollary, the pareto-optimality with compensation criterion,
states that a shift is justified if the gainers from the
move can more than compensate the losers.
Under the economic assumption that producers always try
to maximize their profits, raising costs through regulation
as discussed previously, might cause one to reassess his
alternatives.

Public planners might suddenly find that

their policy of creating better forestry is instead causing
conveifsion to other uses, (see Lundmark, 1975)

The higher
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cost of new practices retards the use of the land for forestry
and favors more efficient uses. (Prutchey, I965)
It is not socially or economically just for forest
operators to pay for reducing negative spillovers.

Their

costs should decrease with better practices.
f"

One solvxtion lies in compensation.

Since the public

I

I benefits, it, through the government, should compensate those
I
I v;ho provide those benefits-. There are two drav/backs to this

J

I solution, though. First is that of specifically identifying
I
Lgainers and losers, and degree. Second is the possibility
that compensation is causing suboptimization, that is, caus
ing the marginal operations that should shut down to remain
open. (Klemperer, 1971)
/'
still, direct compensation remains a plausible means
i
I of redistributing the costs equitably and incidentally,
I

I quieting those v/ho vociferously cry "taking,"

The "taking

^ issue" has shovm itself to be one of the strongest and most
persistant arguments in opposition to governmental planning
and regulation.

The chapter to follow will explain why.

CHAPTER THREE
THE TAKING ISSUE
" . . . the fear o f the talcing issue is stronger
It is an American
I fable or myth that a man can use his land any way
j he pleases regardless of his neighbors. The myth
i survives, even thrives, even though unsupported by
I the pattern of court decisions. Thus, attempts to
1 resolve land use controversies must deal not only
l^with the law but v/ith the myth as well. 23/
j than the taking clause itself.

There is no legal basis, historical or current, for
the proposition that a man may do whatever he likes with
his land.

The concept of property includes separable rights,

referred to in legal parlance as a "bundle of rights."

But

even the fee simple owner does not exercise exclusive con
trol over his land.

His rights are created and maintained

only b?/ the sanction of the soveriegn.

The soveriegn may

modify or appropriate these rights at a.ny time.
Many landowners harbor the myth that their exclusive
rights to O'wnership and use of land have existed from time
immemorial, or at least since the established Constitutional
state.

But property was once held in common, and has only

slowly and gradually evolved into an object that one might
possess to exclusion, (see Barlov/e, 1958)
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The concept of
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exclusive ownership peaked in the early 1800's.

About the

same time, the taking question began to emerge.
In medieval ilngland, v/here our concept of property
emerged, "the idea that a man may do as he likes with his
ovm would have been v/holly denied by lawyers' and philosophers
of that day.

29

The king had unquestioned right to use of

private property, providing the public would benefit.
concept came to America intact.

The

In fact, the only legal

restriction to our soveriegn's power to appropriate and use
land is the self-imposed one:
" . . . nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation,"
Early in the 19th Century, there existed no conflict
between the exercise of the police power and taking by emminent domain.
ally..

Courts construed the Fourth Amendment liter

No compensation need be ma.de unless the land v/as

a.ctually, physically taken.
As the country grew and land becpane scarcer, j.ts value
for both public and private lAses increased,V/ith higher
property values came recognition that simple regulation
could have a severe, sometimes devastating impact on that
value.

Co'irts began to consider the appp.rent conflict.

In December of 1922, Justice Oliver VvendelD. Holmes pronoimced
the now-famous rule:
r
The general rule at least is, that while property
\ may be re:":ulated to a certain extent, if regulatioh
j goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 31/

./
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In establishing this balancing test, Holmes had, says
Bosselman (1973), rewritten the Fourth Amendment,

But since

the high court has decided few takings cases since that landma.rl: one, lower courts are left to interpret the rule.
By and large, courts continue to uphold responsible
regulation of la,nd uses. (Bosselman, 1973)
in common use;

Pour tests are

If the land is physics.lly invaded by govern

mental action, a taking occurs.

If the ov;ner(s) maintains

a public nuisance, courts will be less likely to find a
taking.

Courts will often base their judgement on the dim

inution of value caused by the action, or balance the public
good to be obtained against the private harm.
Courts will justify most land use regulation that is
not a,rbitrary or discrimina,tory and is a reasonable and
well-designed approach to the felt problem.
Forestry cases
The landmark forest practice case V'.'as a 1949 decision
of the V/ashington (state) Supreme Court (State v. Dexter«
202 P,2d 906) which upheld the state's Forest Practice Act
on a Constitutional challenge. It "clearly established that
forest practice laws directed to priva^te property are ConIstitutional and are justified by the need to preserve natural
1
-\2
resources for the public v/elfa.re."
In the case, a timber
owner failed to stop the state from requiring, that seed
trees be left following a harvest.
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Though Oregon's Forest Practice Act "opposed the phil
osophy of personal property rights" according to the State
Forester (Schroeder, 1972) it v/as never challenged and was
rev,Tit ten in 1971.
California's Act vva,s declared tmconstitutional in part
(Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo
County, 97 Cal.Rptr. 431 (1971)).

But the decision addressed

only the delegation of authority by the st8,te legisla,ture
for rule-raaking and enforcement, and not the land use
issue. (Lundmark, 1975)
Popular view
Public opinion is often a stronger force than the
sanction of law.

Land use regulation is one case.

In

particular, the neo-individualists, prominent in most rural
areas and quite so in Ltontana, have the unshakable opinion
that their property is their ovm, and immime to regulation
by the government.

They have unconsciously allied with

the land developers and get-rich-quick businessmen who have
failed to do in the courts v/hat the neo-individualists have
done politically.
One result of the resistance of rural conservatives to
land use regula,tion has been the appropriation (though
"with compensation") and expliotation of the land by spec
ulators with less conscientious regard for the land.
Tho neo-individualists may have a valid point in claim
ing that the government is treading on their personal
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liberties.

Barlowe (1958) has said that public planning is

only exhanging the seeiirity of another's decisions for the
personal freedom to make one's own.
does have rights.

The private landowner

But realization is growing that society,

too, has rights in his property.Thus, we come back to
the conflict over v/hich rights the owner claims and which
society claims.
!
I

i

•

On one side of the issue is 'society' demanding
protection from the negative spillovers,, . . and
oftentimes staking an additional claim to the positive spillovers, . . On the other side we find
the landowner, rarely malicious, but determined
to cla,im the 'reasonable' uses that ownership has
historically conferred upon him. 35/
Is there a solution to this conflict? If so, it lies

in good design of regulation and good communication betv^een
those parties who claim rights and interests, in the re
source.

Francois (1950) suggested one equitable solution:

if V'/e decide that society must compensate individuals for
"takings," then, in Justice, we should require entrepreneurs
to compensate society for diminuation of the social welfare
in his own interest.

Bosselman (1973) cites five alterna

tive solutions, ranging from ignoring the issue to directing,
through legislation, vi/hich situations require compensation.
V/'e would like to design a law v/hich simply does not
restrict the rights of those who already practice good for
estry, but v/hich forces compliance on the transgressors.
Courts and citizens would find this most palatable.

It is

but one of the ideas to keep in mind as we study the le gal
options n^vailable.
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Notes:
1.

This objective is echoed by foresters, particularly
the SAP Task Force on Forest Practices, who recom
mends "the application of . . . knowledge and , . .
principles in order that society can obtain the largest
net sum of benefits from forest lands, , , reflect Ling"!
full consideration of both social and private costs
and benefits." (SAF, 1975)

2,

Barlov/e, 1958*

P. 13.

3,

Francois (1950) divides forest ownerships into three
classes; large, family holdings (usua.lly hereditary
and confined to Europe), comniercial forests and farm
forests. PAPTE (1973) differentiates only betv/een
"industrial" and "other private,"
Industrial lands comprise 13 percent "of commercial
forest land, mostly in the V/est and South, and are
characterized by intensive management and slow ovmership turnover. Small ownerships comprise 59 percent
and are concentra"t;ed in the North and South. PAPTE
divides small ownerships into farms and miscellaneous,
noting that over 42 million acres have shifted out of
farms between 1952 and 1970. The average holding is
71 acres,

4,
5,

PAPTE, 1973. P. 152.
One of the most notable of these is the'American
Forest Institute-J-s Tree Farm program. Small Landov/ners can receive assistance, technical and financial,
from industry in turning their tract into a producing
forest. (Skok, 1975)

6,

YAVPA

7,
8,

State of Montana, 1972. P, 121
"Other private" land covers 296 million acres, generally
of site class III and IV, In most regions, PAPTE found
small forests understocked. In 1956, the Forest Ser
vice found just over half the ownerships in Oregon and
Washington to be adequately (70 percent) stocked. But
in the South, private non-industrial owners increased
the growing stock on their acreages by 56 percent,
compared to 36 percent for industry. (TIcComb, 1975)

9,

My own term, coined to refer to decision-making based
upon a person's characteristics, attitudes and in
clinations rather than his economic possibilities.

10,

Barlowe, p. 114.

estimates that less than ten percent of industry
lands are being clearcut; other silvicultural systems
are gaining favor. Line-skidding systems reduce the
need for roads as well.
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11.

To cite a fev/, the federal-state Cooperative Forest
Management and cost-share and forest incentive pro
grams. Government-sponsered community action groups,
cooperatives and the Conservation Districts are exam
ples of the latter.

12.

The standard disincentive for this is a penalty of
triple the stumpage value.

13.

Despite this, PAPTE has given the nation's foresters
a proposal for meeting the nation's timber and de
veloped recreation needs while neglecting non-market
values and ignoring private owner's rights and de
sires. By conveniently setting a goal of meeting
the nation's timber demand, they proceeded to propose
solutions which would be excellent timber management
and poor people management,

14.

The SAP Task Force on Forest Practices set forth a
series of recommendations on forest practice legis
lation, some of which is highlighted later,

15.

SAP's 1975 president, John Beale, remarked in a pub
lished letter that the SAP does not advocate a forest
practice act, but would like to ensure that those
enacted are competent ones. (Beale, 1975)

16.

A preliminary justification for governmental action.

17.

PAPTE, p. 24.

18.

This term was used by Tomlinson, 1972.

19.

For forestry issues, Cf. Keniston, 1975 and Montana's
EQC Fifth Annixal Report,

20.

Barlowe, p, 461,

21.

The "significance" of the increase is invariably
defined in economic terms,

22.

"Unregulated forest practices will leave opportunities
for public action to increase net satisfactions, thus
suggesting government intervention," Klemperer, 1971.
P, 200.

23.

Regarding forest policy, Ayers cites "indications that,
due to market imperfections, some intervention is nec
essary if certain goals are to be achieved." P, 421

24.

One study in Alberta noted that the costs of road
construction nearly doubled after imposition of en
vironmental constraints. (Otten, 197,5) A study in
the Teton and Boise National Forests showed increases
in logging, administrative and regeneration costs of
26 and 14 percent, respectively, directly attributable
to added environmental measures. (Kemper, 1976)
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25,

The distributive effects of such a program are sig
nificant, The "benefits will accrue to the group too
large and diverse to bargain for itself. More to the
point, the consumers of amenities will benefit which,
in our society, means those affluent enough to travel
and buy recreational equipment. The losses v^'ill be
felt by smaller groups centered around an economic
interest, such as loggers and farmers,

26,

Several writers propose that forest pra.ctice controls
be directed only at lands capable of the largest mar
ginal increase, rather than where management goals
are questionable or sites unsuitable. (Worrell, 1975,
PAPTE, 1973) This leaves low stocked, good quality
industrial lands as prime candidates, (But Of. pp. 9-10)

27,

Article in The Missoulian, February 13, 1975,

28,

Bosselman, 1973.

29,

ibid., p, 75•

30,

This phenomenon may have caused the grov/th of the myth
of exclusive and absolute ownership of property. But
it also triggered social consciousness of the value of
land for public benefit, as evidenced by movements to
establish National Parks and Reserves, and protect
forests and farmlands from owner abuse,

31,

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon. 260 U,S. 413.

32,
33,

Siegal, 1974. P. 208,
It is almost humorous to note that, though our neoindividualists profess loyalty to the basic institu
tion of democracy as expressed in our Constitution,
they deny the expression of that democracy in the
actions of government. They will encourage any action
or pronouncement that strengthens their concepts of
rights and fight any trend in the opposite direction.
They regard a relatively recent development as the
Constitutional truth but choose to ignore a trend of
longer standing — the regulation of property for the
public welfare,
Proponents of forest practice legislation have tried
to include anesthetic rights as one of those protected
for society. Though landowners would hardly admit
that "aesthetics" is definable as a right, they have
successfully fov.ght handing over that right to society,
(Lukes, 1977b, Mattock, 1977)

34,

35,

Healy, 1976,

318-9.

P, 176.

PART II

CURRENT OPTIONS

Vi/ithin the past seven years, new forest practice
legislation has been proposed in national, state and local
governing bodies.

This new surge of attention corresponds

to the increased environmental awareness of the 70's.
Prior forest practice lav^s dealt with regulation to ensure
a productive timber resource.

The nev/ generation of laws

and proposals recognize a more diverse set of needs.
In this Part, I will review a few of the exemplary
options:

their political and legal histories, assessments

of their effectiveness or failure, and their shortcomings.
I have chosen seven examples;

EPA's model state forest

practice act, the laws in California, Washington, Oregon
and Idaho, Montana's proposal and a Lev/is and Cla^rk County
Conservation District Sediment Control proposal.

Each has

its ov;n unique history and features.
An overviev^ of the evolution of federal, state and
local responsibilities begins this discussion.

As an aid

to these options, I include also an outline of each.,
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CHAPTER POUR
THE FIGHT FOR FOREST PRACTICE ADMINISTRATION

Historica,lly, most pov/er over the ownership and use
of private land rests with the ste^tes who have, in turn,
delegated ratich of it to local government.

But the federal

government has stepped in, in some forms and circumstances,
vvho has the pov^er to regulate forest practices?

V/ell, that

question has yet to be ans\vered-r-finally.
Each level has advantages and drav^backs.

Federal

government is often too far av/ay from the problem and con
cerned with other issues.

State government is traditionally

less efficient, but can ensure stability and continuity
better than local governments.^

Tjocal officials must at

the same time govern friends and neighbors and protect
societjr's interests.

Local officials faced with land use

policy decisions may fail to exercise the power, fearing
the local citizenry.

And they may be all too much aware

of a decision's impact on the local tax base.

Any number

of political reasons can influence a governing body,
Montana's EQC has stated that planning and regulation
should, come from the lowest effective level of government,
'A'hethcr it be federal, state or local.

35

Each program should
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be viewed on a case-by-case basis.

This is true in the

case of forest practices.
Z®deral regulation
Skok (1975) says that " rcrp.ilation at the national
level ha-s been a frequently discussed, proposed and re
jected solution."

The debate has surfaced in 1910, 1923,

the early 40's and again in 1971.

The 1923 controversy

culminated in the pa.ssage in 1924 of the Clarke-McWary Act,
providing cooperative forest fire protection V/ith states
to protect "forest a,nd water resources and the continuous
production of timber," (16 U.S.C.A, s.564)
In 1938 a bill to control forest practices v/as intro
duced into Congress and spurred a presidential study of the
problem. (PAPTH, 1973)

The states took notice; they (and

industry) favored passage of state laws to forestall Con
gressional action.
Schroeder (1972) and Hamilton (1963) have cited the
threat of federal regulation as a prime mover in passage
of the Oregon and Hew York laws, respectively.

The forest

industry preferred state laws, too -- possibly because they
were easier to circumvent.
The forest Lands Restoration and Protection Act of
1971 (defeated) proposed licenses for professiona^l fores
ters and mandatory ha.rvesting plans for private lands.
Again, the early 70's sav/ scurrying for reform and support
of state laws.

Passage of the P>.'PCA in 1970, with its non—
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point pollution provisions, requires still more of state
government.

And a draft bill being circulated for comment

by the Forest Service (PS Draft: 12-23-76) will, at the
least, revamp federal cooperative forestry programs.
In most cases, though, the federal government is too
far away from the people for effective strong-arming.

Its

major approach is now through financial and technical assis
tance,

State control in forest practice administration

has been tentatively, if not finally, established.

The

federal government can and should play a role in assistance
programs; the state is talcing the lead in enforcement of
the policy.

But local goverruments claim some role in forest

practice regulation, too, with or without the authority.
Local control
"Local control" is a magic word in current political
circles.

But not all is praise.

Local control can bear

an assortment of connotations^ (from Healy, 1976)
First, local control can mean the predominance of
local interests.

But community values seldom escape the

influence of state control.

Second, local control may mean

control by local decision-makers.

It implies that decisions

on a person's land may be made by a drinking buddy, or by a
local tyrant.

Third, local control may mean no control.

Even the mildest controls signify "taking" for a rural com
munity v.'here property is the first sjrmbol of v/ealth.

Few

decision-makers would risk their necks over such an issue.
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T.P, Arvola presents an exemplary model of localpstate conflict in California.^ Coimties in that state '/'/ere
I
I fighting for control. Montarca faces a different situation,
5 though.

For one thing, counties in Montana have no ordin-

jance-making pov/er unless authorized by the state legislaiJ

i

I ture.

In our state, a more likely avenue for local control

*-is the state's conservation districts.

CD's have been

given the power to regulate by ordinance sediment and ero^
sion control.

They are just beginning to realize that power.
•*

*

*

It seems apparent that any of the three levels of
government would like to control the pov/er to regulate
forest practices, but none are enthusiastic about the
responsibility.

In the chapters to follow, I shall examine

the most relevant offerings of the federal and state gov
ernments and the conservation districts.

CHAPTER FIVE
EPA'S MODEL STATE FOREST PRACTICES ACT
The Environraenfca.1 Protection Agency is the federal
a.:?;ency created to oversee the federal role in environmental
affaArs.

Hearly all the afrency's powers derive from recent

legislation such as the Clean x\ir Act Amendments of 1970
(42 IJ.3.C.A. 18^7) and the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972. (PL 92-500)^
Section 203(b) of PV/PCA requires states to prepare
a process to (i) identify, if aporopriate, afrriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint
sources of pollution . . . (ii) set forth proce
dures and methods (including land use requirements)
to control to the extent feasible such sources.
The administrator of the EPA must (section 304(e))
issue to states , . . information including (l)
guidelines for identifying and evaluating the
nature and extent of nonpoint sources of pollu
tants, and (2) processes, procedures and methods
to control pollution resulting from—
(A) agricultural and silvicultural activities,
including runoff from fields and crop and
forest lands.
The 8,gency chose to prepare an exemplary forest practice
act as one aporoach to that duty.^ (Aronoff, 1975)
Actually, the EPA fulfilled its 304 charge via three
separate approaches.

First, the agency researched methods
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of evaliiation and control of silvicultural pollution.
reports on this topic appeared in October, 1973.

Two

Secondly,

a rei?;ional team came together in Seattle to consider "tech
nical, legal and administrative mechanisms which can be
used to minimize water pollution arising from forest management activities."

6

Thirdly, the agency itself looked at

existing federal and state legislation.

The forest prac

tice act is a result of both the second and third approaches.
It aims to ensure that forest operators use the "best known
management prsxtices" thus preventing the cause of pollu
tion rather than controlling the sjrmptoms. (Agee, 1972)
Reaction
The agency offered its proposal as a vehicle for
thought and discussion, it said, and without recommenda
tion. (Agee, 1972)

Discussion, it aroused.

The first

draft of the bill, in November of 1974, prompted several
hundred written comments, mostly from the industry sector.
(United States EPA, 1975b)

Conmientators criticized "scenic

beauty" as a consideration, proportion of representation
on forest practice•boards and the administrative compli
cations of the act.

Many of these suggestions v/ere heeded

in the later drafts, (Aronoff, 1975)
In addition to comments on the language of the model
act, some also questioned its purpose,

Fred March, a coimsel

for EPA, pointed out that the act did not clearly state its
purpose, viz, prevention of polluting practices, ( Johnson,

1975)

Several other commentators sug^^ested also that FWPCA

at least be cited as justification for the actions.

Dennis

LeMaster, in a Journal of Forestry article, noted that the
proposal made no attempt to measure the degradation or
restoration of v/ater quality,-and also that passage of the
law in itself did not assure a state of meeting its 208
responsibilities. (LeKaster, 1975)
The latest draft of the EPA model has been neither
endorsed nor adopted by any state-level entities.

But it

has stimulated discussion and some ap-nrehension among pro
fessional forest managers and landowners on account of its
provisions and approaches.

It has offered new ideas and

alternatives, some better than others v/hen we apply them
to Montana's case, as I shall in Part III.
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STATE FOREST PRACTICES ACT (EPA DRAFT, March 13, 1975)
1)

TITLE:

(

)

2)

POLICY/PURPOSE:

Forest Practices Act.

Act encourages forest management

serving the public need for timber and other forest
products and the protection of water and soil.
Purpose of act is to create a comprehensive system
of regulation, and to achieve compliance v\rith fed
eral laws and regulations.
3)

DEFINITIONS.

4)

STATE FOREST PRACTICE BOARD:
general public.

Appointed from the

Persons with direct financial

interest in forestry may not form majority.
Four-year, overlappijig terms.
5)

DUTIES OF BOARD:

Divides state into districts based

on geophysica.l similarities.

Board makes regula

tions applicable to each district, with public
review, and acts as appellate body.

6)

DIRECTOR OF BOARD:

7)

REGULATIONS:

State Forester.

Required for reforestation, streambank

protection, erosion control, air and v/ater quality,
insect and pest control and timber harvesting plans.
Interagency (state) cooperation.

Individual var

iances allowed upon proof of non-degradation.
8)

TIMBER IIARVI' STING PLAN;
j

Professionally prepared plan

required for operations over (

).

Plan is the

responsibility of timber owner and must include
description of silviculture used and jjlans for
erosion control, reforestation and protection of
unique areas.

No state approval required.
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NOTICE:

Operator must notify state forester at least

seven da^/s prior to commencing operation.
INSPECTIONS:

State forester or representative may

mtake all necessa-ry inspections.
VIOMTIONS:

State forester notifies operator of the

violation, includes order
damages.

to cease and repair

State forester may, with "board approval,

perform needed repairs and charge costs as lien
against property of operator and owner.

Affected

parties may appeal.
PENALTIES:

Civil penalty for infraction of rules or

failure to comply with orders,
LICENSING- OP OPERATORS:

Timber operators must have

state-issued licenses, renewed a^nnually.

License

may be denied or revoked for failure to operate
v.'ith a license or non-corapliance with rules and
regulations.
CITIZEN'S SUITS:

Citizens may bring suit against

board or the state forester for failure to perform
duties as required.

CHAPTER SIX

FOREST PRACTICE LAWS IN T?IE WESTERN STATES

In 1973, 16 of the 50 states had some form of forest
practice law.

In the Rocky Mountain-Pacific region, Colo

rado, vliromlng and Montana have no laV'/s.

Four states which

do, I have singled out for study because of their physical
and social siraila.rities to Montana.
California
Of the four states, California is probably•least like
Montana.

Pressures of population create demands for both

timberland and open space.

More people mean more pressures

and more problems.
California enacted forest practice legislation in
1945, but amendments and criticism hindered the law.

Envi

ronmental advocates claimed that the lav/'-s purpose, "to
conserve and maintain the productivity of the timber lands,"
placed too little emphasis on non-market resources.

Some

landowners felt that the law v/as too strict and a violation
of their property rights.

And administrators pointed up

the cumborsome enforcement procedures, loopholes and inadeqxaate funding to carry out th© law.(Arvola, 1970)
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•Beginning in 1967, the old forest practice lav/ was
scrutinized and revisions proposed by the SAP,, industry and
legislative committees.

Not everyone was convinced that

a new law was needed until, in 1973, the state Supreme
Q
Court declared parts of the old law unconstitutional.
In that year, the California Legislature passed the
Z ?berg-Negedly Forest Pra.ctice Act (Div. 4, Chap. 8, Public
Resources Code).

Many consider the new law to be the

strictest in the nation. (Siegal, 1974)

The law allows

counties to enact their own regulations, requires timber
harvesting plans approved by the state, sets up r^egional
advisory committees and establishes some regulations con
cerning residual stocking, fire control measures and soil
and water protection.
The 'California Act seems an exercise in superfluous
language.

In briefing it, I found that several provisions

are unnecessarily repeated as portions of others, and others
are simply extraneous.

Other critics, too, have pointed

to the complexity and administrative burden of the law.
In mid-January of 1975, a state court invalidated a later
amendment to the law which had exempted it from the re
quirements of the California Environmental Quality Act.
(California, 1975)

These shortcomings impair the effec

tiveness of the law.
Since the enactment of its Act, the state has added
48 full-time foresters to its staff.

During 1975, the
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Division of Forestry issued 1,266 licenses to timber oper
ators, made 5,668 inspections and reviewed 2,152 timber
harvestine'; plans.

In that year, the Division estimated a

96 percent compliance rate. (California, 1975)

Most of the

violations were operators failing to notify the Division
of termination of their operations.
This year, the California Assembly is conducting over
sight hearings, v/hich the Division anticipates will result
in amendments "oriented to more consideration of the environ
ment in conducting of timber operations." (MacClean, 1976)
Washington
The state of Washington resembles Montana in physio
graphy.
gions.

It has its wet and dry, mountainous and flat re
The state depends on the productivity of its forest

lands for economic and social benefits.
social climate differs.

But the two states'

Washington's urban population,

and the way of thinking that goes with it, is spreading and
growing.

As urbanites grow in raw numbers and percentage

of the popula-tion, their influence grov/s, too.

As in Cal

ifornia, their demand for all land uses grows in kind.
The state enacted forest practice legislation for the
first time in 1945.

The law was timber oriented.

But

cutting and regeneration standards were written into the
law, making it difficult to alter as times changed.9

The

1945 law was the point in controversy in State v. Dexter,
referred to on page 27.
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In 1973, a revised forest practice law was introduced
in the Washington Legislature.

The bill reflected strong

environmental interests, although "preservationists were
rebuffed in attempts to include orovision for wilderness
. . , on private lands, crimina.1 . . . penalties and a
strict system of pennits."^^
The 1974 and 1975 sessions^^ passed the current law.
The Act has extensive legal requirements and options for
enforcement and rule-making.

Administratively, it is an

expensive law, since it involves at least five agencies
and several levels of regulation.
The state's Division of Forestry, which is the lead
agency, had some doubts about the la-w, since resolved.
Forester Bruce T'onell (1977) commented that there were
"rough spots" but the Act is now working well.

Earlier,

Don Lee Fraser (1974) — the State Forester — complained
that the new lav/ permitted too many agencies to have a
"finger in the pie."

But, he said, with a little effort

it would be worked out.
I have not yet received figures on the costs or the
effectiveness of the administration of the Act.
Oregon
Oregon and Y/ashin9-ton are physiographic twins.

Oregon

stands out, though, with its strong reputation for environ
mental consciousness.

Oregon's Forest Practice Law is not

stricter as a result; it is easier to understand and enforce
than either California's or Washington'fj.
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Oref^on's 1941 law, the Conservation Act, was one
spurred by the threat of federal legislation.

It had the

early support of forest industries in the state, though it
was considerc;d "very progressive." (Schroeder, 1972)

Its

provisions were administered by a forest practices board,
which had been formed in 1911 v/ith seven members.
l8,w had limited scope and effectiveness.

The 1941

It addressed only

the timber supply problem, through reforestation.

Enforce

ment was lacking —- forfeit of bond or pa^ymerit of planting
fees vera the only penalties.

And, ].ilce its contemporaries,

it was to inflexible to meet the changes. (Siegal, 1974)
Concern over the law solidified in 1968 with a meeting
of 41 forestry leaders to discuss and recommend changes.
As a result of this m.eeting, the Board of Forestry in Sep
tember recommended that
the early accomplishments of the Conservation Act
... be recognized, but that it was now necessary/
to update the Act in keeping with broader public
interests and increasing Icnowledge of the effect
of forest conditions on the various forest benefits.
The Department of Forestry drafted a. bill v/ith the help
of other interest groups.

Surprisingly, v.'hen the Depart

ment's bill entered the legislature, industrial interests
proposed a SLibstitute bill.

The opposing forces compromised,

and the new version passed without trouble. (Mattock, 1977)
In a Ph.D. Dissertation the same year (completed before
the new law passed), Dave Xleraperer outlined the administra
tive goal of the ne-.v policy:

costs should be minimised
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t'hrough single agency administration, with minimal permit
and inspection requirements.

Gene Mattock (1977) of the

State Forester's office stressed, too, the key goal of
single agency administration.

It seems the goal v/as achieved;

V.'ashington* s Law involves at least five agencies, Oregon's
ono,^^

Oregon's Lav/ also emphasizes standards rather than

practices.

This approach hp,s been favored lately, though

California still emphasizes the latter. (Siegal, 1974) In
the Board and agency rule-making, three goa;ls come through;
1) the emphasis is on prevention of the damage rather
than enforcement after the fact,
2) single agency administration is the goal, and
3) wherever possible, cooperation between agencies,
industry and the public is encouraged. (Oregon, 1977)
Though by most accounts the Forest Practice Act is
working well, some groups have attempted to change the di
rection of policy-making.

HB 2997, introduced in the 1977

session, would reduce the number of persons having "economic
interest" in forestry from six to "not more than four" on
the state Board, and from 2/3 to "not more than 1/3" on
local committees.Such a change would reduce not only
the number of industry representatives; it wotild eliminate
local landowners and operators as well.
Right now, the Act seems to be v/orking the best of
any in the Western states.

Somewhat over 14 man-years were

expended in enforcing the law in its first year, 2/3 in

50
15
inspections.

Citations in the first year totaled 128,

most of them for failure to submit a notice or inadequate
stream protection.

Violations split evenly between large

and small operations. (Oregon, 1973)

Over the first 14

months, the compliance rate v.'as 93 percent, (Siegal, 1974)
and rose to 98.3 percent in 1976.

In that year, the agency

made 8,760 contacts, about 11 percent of which required
some form of remedial action.

The budget for enforcement

over the biennium was ii>l,263,460 including roughly 37 full
time positions, (Oregon, 1977)
Idaho
Of the four states in my review, Idaho is nearest to
Montana, both physically and sociologically.

Besides

bounding our state, it has the same open, dry plains and
rocky, steep forests.

It also has an urban population,

but one which does not threaten to sv/eep over the rural
communities, a,nd landowners who fight tooth and nail to
keep their government to a minim\xm.

In fact, Idaho so

resembles Ilontana that the state successfully adopted our
forest practice proposal — almost unaltered — in their
own legislature,
Idaho's first law, the 1937 Cooperative Sustained
Yield Districts Act, established rules by legislation and
16
was similar in structure to Washington's 1945 law.
And,
like its contemporaries, the much-amended law was criti
cised for being narrow, lenient and inflexible. (Siegal)
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The current law passed the 1974 Legislature after
sponsership "by the Idaho Forest Industries Council.

The

legislature made only one change in the bill; it removed
landowners from the lien liability.
The politics of passage must have been fascinating.
The Department of Lands (the lead agency) ignored the bill,
fearing the label of "empire-building."

And the environ

mental groups remained neutral; their support would have
meant sure death in the conservative legislature. (Gillette,
1977)

Though the Forest Practice Act met no opposition in

the legislature, one state official described the subsequent
rule-making hearings in Northern Idaho as "brutal."

Land

owners came loaded for bear, and the local right-wing
element appeared in force.

Because of this opposition,

forest practice rules went into effect only last summer,
and foresters have been instructed to enter lands only
v?ith the landowner's permission. (Gillette, 1977)
Several lav/suits were filed to enjoin the enforcement
of the law, but all were dismissed for vagueness. (Moon,
1975b)

The Department feels it may be facing-the first

legal challenge to its regulations in early 1977.
State Lands has hired five new foresters and spent an
estimated $70,000 to administer the law, but is losing groimd.
It makes inspections, on a "oriority basis, of reported vio
lations and high damage potential areas.

Compliance is

about 90 percent, with many violations minor.
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Z'BERG-NEJEDLY FOREST PRACTICE ACT OP I973
(div, 4, chap. 8, Pub. Res. Code)
1)

GEiTERAL PROVISIONS:

The State shall encourage manage

ment which considers the public need for all re
sources.

Purpose of lav; is to create regulation

v;hich assures timber productivity and resource
values.

Counties have authority to create their

own regulp.tions.

Annual reports from the Board.

2)

DEFiniTIONS:

extensive.

3)

DISTRICTS AND COMMITTEES;

At least three districts,

to be determined by physical similarities.

Nine

member district advisory committees, five from
public, three from industry, one from range-livestock.
None may have direct financial interest in timber.
4)

RULES AND REGULATIONS:

Board adopts district rules

for fire- control, erosion, water quality, stocking
and harvest plans.

Rules must be based on inter

disciplinary study and public hearings.
5)

RESOURCE CONSERVATION STANDARDS:

Legislative standards

governing residual stand stocking levels and fire
protection zones.

Directs the im-olementation of

soil erosion studies and waterway protection rules,
6)

LICENSES:

For ti^riber operators, renewed annually.

License may be denied or revoked for failure, to
comply with rules,
7)

TI!.l BER HARVESTING:

Timber operations require harvest

plan prepared by professional forester and approved
by State Forester,

Copies of plan go to State Board

of Equalization and the county assessor.

Profes

sional forester must reviev/ and approve ongoing
operations,

Ov^'ner must submit notice of comple

tion and, v/ithin five years, proof of restocking.
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8)

PKKALTIliiS AwD "ilNFORCEMi'iliT:

Violations are misdemeanors.

State Forester must make site inspections before,
during and after operations.

He may obtain court

order to hB,lt operations and require corrections,
or take action to correct damage himself, expenses
becoming a lien on the timbered property.
9)

CONVERSION:

Only by application.

If tract is zoned'

for timberland, conversion must be in public inter
est and have no adverse effects on environment.
Landowner must receive permit from Board, and must
comply with all harvesting requirements.
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WA3HIIIGT0N FOREST PRACTICE ACT OP 1974 (as amended, 1975)
(76.09 R.C.W,)
1)

POLICY:

It is in the public interest to manage forest

lands so as to protect resources and maintain the
forest industry, and to adopt comprehensive regu
lations to that effect,

2)

DEFINITIONS:

3)

FOREST PRACTICES BOARD:

Moderate.
Composed of the heads of the

Departments of Public Lands, Commerce, Agriculture
and Ecology, a county official and six members of
the general public.
4)

DUTIES OP BOARD;

Pour-year, appointed terms,

Promulgate minimum forest practice

standards, and water quality standards concurrent
with Department of Ecology,

Public hearings, and

review by affected agencies and counties,
5)

CLASSIFICATION OP PRACTICES:

Class I, practices with

no significant damage potential need ^ approval;
Class II, practices Y/ith low potential for damage,
written notice is necessary;

Class III, other

practices generally need Departmental approval
before commencement; Class IV, practices on lands
undergoing conversion or changes severe enough to
necessitate EI3, Counties have veto power over
Departmental approvals.
6)

NOTICE AND APPLICATION;

Documents must include type

of practice proposed, reforestation plan and phy
siographic data.
of operations.

Long-range plans may cover a series

Provisions for changes in operation,

emergency practices and conversions.
7)

REFORESTATION;

Must be successfully established

within three years under artificial techniques
or five years if by natural means.
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Department may issue an order to stop

STOP WORK ORDER;

violation of regulations or divergence from ap
proved plan.

Operators may appeal.

KOTICii OF VIOLATION:

In place of a stop work order,

the Department may notify operator of violation and
measures needed to correct damage, if any.
WATER QUALITY PROTECTIOK:

Department of Ecology may

enforce, through Department of Natural Resources or
appeals board, v/ater quality regulations.
DECISIONS;

Pinal decision of Department or appeals

board is binding unless overturned.
FAILURE TO TAI<E ACTION;

If operator fails to correct

damage, Department may do so and charge costs to
operator and owner by lien.
FAILURE TO OBEY STOP WORK ORDER;

Department may take

immediate action to stop operation or avoid damage.
ACTION TO ENFORCE;

Department or county may take

legal action to enforce regulations.
INSPECTIONS:

Department has right of entry and must

make inspections before, during and after operation.
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY:
PENALTIES;
fine.

Right of entry to enforce,

Violation of law or regulations subject of
Determination by Department, but may be ap

pealed.

Attorney general may bring legal action.

DISPOSITION 0? PINES:

Pines go to state general fund.

Monies for reimbursement of damage correction costs
go directly to Department.
VIOLATIONS;

Gross Misdemeanor.
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FOREST PRACTICE ADVISORY COITOIITTEE:

Appointed by

Governor, includes educators, agencies, landowners
and general public.
Board.

Recommends regulations to

May .designate from tv/o to five regiona.l

committees to draft local rules.
APPEALS BOARD:

Three members appointed by Governor,

of which one must be a lav/yer.
DUTIES OP APPEALS BOARD;
part-time.

Board may be either full- or

Board v/ill make written findings of

fact for each case heard,
APPEALS PROCEDURE:

Appellant may request formal or

informal hearing.
due process.

Board has all powers related to

De Novo .judicial review available,

LOCAL GOVERM'.IENT:

Local governments prohibited from

passing forest practice regulations except incidental
to land use planning, taxation, public health or
Shoreline Protection Act pov^ers.
PUBLIC EDUCATION:

Board policy to orient and train

individuals to good forest practices and regtilations,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION;

Department may co

oper-!te with federal government and other states
in studying forest practices.
RESEARCH;

Department may recommend research needs.

RIGHT OP ENTRY FOR STREAM MAINTENENCE;

Landowners

must permit agency personnel to enter property
for piirpose of clearing log jams and debris from
streams.
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OREGON FOREST PRACTICE ACT (1971)
(ORS 527.610 to 527.990)
1)

TITLE:

Ore,'-on Forest Practice Act.

2)

DEFINITIONS:

3)

POLICY:

Brief.

To encourage practices that maintain and

enhance social and economic benefits, and to avoid
confusion in the laws and regulations of agencies.
Board has authority to adopt regional rules for
sustained yield, protection of forest resources
and interagency coordination.
4)

FOREST REGIONS:

Not less than three.

5)

FOREST PRACTICE COMMITTEES;

Advisory in each region.

Members must be qualified by education/experience.
At least 2/3 must be ov.ners or operators of forest
land.
6)

Three year terms.

COM/IITTEE DUTIES:

Recommends rules and regulations

appropriate for the region,
7)

NOTICE:

Notification of State Forester prior to oper

ation;

he notifies Department of Revenue and county

assessor.

No approval needed for operation.

Any

change in operation requires further notice,
8)

VIOLATION:

State Forester will serve citation on

operator specifying nature of violation and damage.
The order will direct the operator to cease oper
ations and repair damage, if possible.

Owner or

operator may appeal.
9)

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER;

State Forester may,

with Board authorization or owner's approval, re
pair damages and charge costs as lien against the
operator and/or owner.
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APPEALS:

Ov/ner or operator may appeal to committee of

the Board and, further, to state circuit court.
DUTIES OF BOARD:

Board must adopt minimum standards

in each region covering reforestation, road con
struction, harvesting, chemical use and slash dis
posal.

Provides for intergovernmental cooperation.

PURPOSE OP RUIdiiS:

They shall be designed to meet the

objectives of forest-related rules of other agencie
GOMVERSIOU:
PENALTIES;
penality

The law does not preclude conversion.
Violation is a misdemeanor. ' Severity of

varies according to section violated.
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IDAHO FOREST PRACTICE ACT (1974)
1)

TITLE:

2)

POLICY/PURPOSE:

(38-1301 et seq., I.C.)

Ido-ho Forest Practice Act.
To encourage practices on forest land

which maintain and enhance social and economic ben
efits; and to frrant the Board of Land Coramisioners
authority to adopt rules for sustained yield and
the protection of forest resources.
3) DE FINIT10 N 3;
4)

M ode rg,t e.

DUTIES OF Till! BOARD:

The Board will adopt regional

standards for harvesting, road construction, regen
eration, chemical use and slash disposal,
5)

DUTIES OF DEPAPiTr.TEIlT:

Department of Lands will enforce

the lav/, appoint advisory committees, assist the
Board, coordinate agencies and assist landowners.
6)

NOTIFICATION OF FOREST PRACTICES:

Notice required

before commencement or changes in opera.tion.
approval needed.

No

No notice required if operation

complies with approved management plan.

Notices

o,re valid for two years, renev/able.
7)

8)

NOTICE OF VIOLATION:

Department will make determin

ation and notify landowner.

It may order operator

to cease and repair damage.

Provision for appeal.

REPAIR OF DAMAGE:

Department ma.y repa.ir damages and

charge costs against operator, a,nd ovmer, as author
ized by the board.
9)

DUTY OF PURCHA3SH:

Initial purchas-er must be able to

furnish proof of operator's notice.
10) VIOLATIONS;

T'isdemeanor.

11)

T ; NF0RCL !'j1;NT:

12)

COKVE-.'SIOH:

Department of Lands is responsible.
The lav; docs not preclude conversion.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE MONTANA EXPERIENCE
Wontanaiis have tried and failed to enact comprehensive
forest practice legislation.

In 1973» the state Division

of Forestry sponsered a bill (SB 405)—defeated in 1974»
The 1975 version (SB 157), made some ch8.nges; it was pri
marily sponsered by industrial interests, but had broad
support from other organizations.
Both environmental and industry groups supported the
1975 bill,

v/hy, then, did it fail?

In Oregon and Cali

fornia, the ba.ttle line for forest practice legislation
was drawn (and still exists) between these two interests.
In Montana, the adversity seems to be more between the
popula.tion in general and certain members of the governing
body.
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Two in particular, George TlcCallum s,nd Chris Stobie,

have opposed a law unalterably.

And though these two both

claim to represent the Sanders County population, the evi
dence and my experience both indicate that resistance from
that area mas'" result more from their provocation than from
a democratic groundswell of opinion.
Our 1973 proposal was modelled closely on Oregon's
Act.

The State Eorester chose to try introducing it in
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the Senate because, he reasoned, it would encounter more
resistance there.

He was correct.

The bill met a hostile

Natural Resources Committee and lanf^uished until 1974.

In

late 1973, Montana's j:1Q0 endorsed it (Montana, 1973) which
effect on the legislators was doubtful.

The bill was final

ly defeated on the floor, 29-19, February 6, 1974.
An historical note from the Division of Forestry (1975)
listed some of the objections raised to the bill.

Legis

lators felt the enforcement by lien against pronerty was
too harsh a measure.

Also, they said, the identification

of "scenic values" as a public resource could lead directly
to conflicts with private property rights, since the term
does not yet have a precise definition.

There was some

question about the effect of the bill on extant operations,
though that qtaestion was clarified by amendment during the
'73 session.

Finally, George McCallum worried that his

Christmas Tree Farm would fall under the Act's auspices.
The bill as introduced in 1975 was strongly 3.nd pub
licly supported by industry, conservation, environmental
and public interest groups. (Moon, 1975^)

Changes in the

bill accomodated every objection raised, though it weakened
18

the proposal considerably.

No liens or scenic values

were mentioned, and ongoing operations and Christmas Tree
farms were exempted.
Senator Roskie, aDparently a supporter of the bill,
asked the Division of Forestry for fodder for his floor
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debate.

He asked the Division whether it had a:ny sort of

incentive proposals to offset the coercive aspects of the
bill.

He felt that if landowners could be compensated for

their increased coats, it might take some of the sting out
of regulation. (Moon, 1975a)
ThoTigh the Division did apparently invent a quick
study proposal, the bill went down to defeat on March 5th,
by a vote of 32-17.

The vote made it clear, said Gary Moon

(1975^), that the bill's demise was more a result of "deter
mined opposition of several small forest practices (sic)
operators, small forest landov/ners and ranchers" than a
logical appraisal of the raea^sure. Accomodating every ob
jection had not made the slightest difference.
An informal survey by Mark Ahner (1975). for the Div
ision of Forestry shortly after the Senate's action dis
closed that resistance was, indeed, small but vocal.

Of

several groups that he visited, only the Flathead Christmas
Tree Growers Association was violently opposed to the bill
— not surprising since George McCallum is its president.
But all other groups, including Lions Clubs, the Lincoln
County Committee for Rural Development and the V/estern
Montana Loggers Association all believed in the proposal
as a benefit to Montana and Montanans.

Even county com-

misioners in Y/estern Montana were quoted as supporting the
"concept," though preferring incentive-based approaches,
(intermountain Logging News, 1974)
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The proposal at this writing is not dead; its sponsers
are waiting for an opportune time to make a third attempt.
But it remains to "be seen, what manner of legislation will
satisfy the illogica.1 opposition of a determined few v/ith
the balancc of power and yet effectively serve the needs of
the indiAstry, the public and the resource.
law is not the answer in Montana,

Possibly, state
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A BILL RELATING TO FOREST PRACTICES (SB 157, 44th Session)
1)

TITLE:

Montana Forest Practice Act (1975).

2)

POLICY/PIJHPOSE;

To encourage forest practices which

maintain social and economic benefits and resources.
Board granted authority to adopt rules for sustained
yield and the protection of forest resources,
3)

DEPIKITIOKS:

Minimal.

4)

DUTIES OF BOARD:

Board must adopt regional rules

governing harvesting, road construction, refor
estation, chemical use and slash disposal,
5)

POWERS AND DUTIES OF DEPARTl'lENT;

Department will

appoint an advisory coimcil and enforce the act.
6)

NOTICE:

Operator must notify Department before com

mencement of operation.

No approval needed.

A

single, annual notice may be substituted.
7)

DUTY OF PURCHASER:

Commercial purchaser must be able

to furnish proof of notice by operator,
8)

VIOLATION:

Department may order operator to cease

violating practice or operation.
appeal.
9)

Provision for

Operators may continue non-violating action,

MISDEMEANOR:

Failure to file notice or comply v^ith

Departmental rules.
10)

LEGAL ASSISTANCE:

11)

PEACE OFFICERS:

12)

CONVERSION:

Indictment by Department,

Available to Department from state,

Departmental authority,

Conversion to other uses must be done

v/ithin time normally required for reforestation.

CHAPTER EIGHT
THE LOCAL CONTROL ALTERNATIVE

In the 1940's, one author wrote that "local super
vision" is best; the supervisors are more closely in touch
with the problem and can better grasp, and work to achieve,
the goals we set. (Recknagel, 1945)

He was referring to

a preference for state law over federal.

Thirty years

later, vie are using the same reasoning to go one step fur
ther—to the coimty level.

The general purpose government
iq

a,nd the conservation districts are prime candidates.
County planning

County level land use planning is not a new concept.
In 1935» almost 300 county planning commissions existed in
the TJ,3,

In 1938, the Department of Agriculture began a

"grassroots system of planning'," hoping to bring av/areness
and a sense of participation to local citizens.
The program mushroomed until, by 1941, almost 2/3 of
all the agricultural coiinties in the nation had locallysponsered planning committees.

These committees were

charged v;ith gathering information, classifying resources
and preparing plans to solve the specific problems of their
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county.

The program

focused attention on the merits of community
self-evalu.ation and . . , local remedial section
programs. . . and resulted in the better inte
gration of several state and federal programs
at the local level. 20/
In that year, though, the federal government v/ithdrew
its support, claiming lack of-local commitment.
the committees survived, most faded away.

Some of

Only where the

local citizens felt a need, instead of having it suggested
to them from above, was the program a continuing success.
(Barlov/e, 1953)
Montana county governments have never, to my knowledge,
expressed a desire to asstwne the responsibility for admin
istering a forest practice program.

Most county govern

ments in Montana are part-time affairs; they have neither
the expertise to administer a policy themselves nor the
time or money to delegate that responsibility to others.
Furthermore, counties in Wfontana have no legislative power.
Though the commissioners form a coiinty legislature in name,
they have no pov/er to make lavv' until and imless approved
by the state.
The new (1973) Constitution and House Bill 110^^ might
have changed that.

Counties could have assumed self-govern-

ment pov/ers through the voter review process.
small handful even attempted it so far.

But only a

As it stands, no,

county has full powers of law-making yet.
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In short, counties have neither the pov.'er nor the
expertise to implement and administer a forest practice
policy.

The future may hold a different story; expanded

financial fitness and authority could put Montana counties
in the spotlight.

But at present, they are dead ends.

Soil conservation districts
About the same time county planning was tried, the
federal government experimented v.dth another approach to
local involvement.

In 1937, the Department of Agriculture

proposed a model state Soil Conservation Districts Law.
Conservation districts would be an autonomous branch of
state government, electing their own officers from local
landowners and having certain pov/ers to guide — by persuation and regulation — the use of land.
In 1952, fifteen years later, 2,300 districts were in
existance.

Most v/ere given power to enact land use ordin

ances, but only fifteen had passed any.
There has been no rush on the part of the
districts to adopt land use ordinances. Major
emphasis has thus far been placed on voluntary
measures to foster soil conservation. But the
existance of authority . . . suggests , . .
possibilities for the expanded use of regula
tions of this type in the direction of land
resotirce use practices in the future. 22/
The opportunity to use this pov/er to guide agricultural,
forest and construction practices in Montana is becoming
apparent.
Montana enacted its Soil Conservation Districts Law
in 1939 (Title 76, R.C.M. 1947).

The law gave the power
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of ordinance-making to the districts in section 76-109.
district has yet exercised this por/er.

V /ith

No

the passage of

PVVPCA, and its mandate to eliminate nonpoint pollution, sev
eral resea,rchers have noted that conservation districts
have ujitapped potential,

"Since erosion , , . is the lead

ing soixrce of nonpoint pollution, this [ordinance-making^
authority could be vital."

2^

Are the districts ready to pick up the ba.ll?

In a

recent survey, district supervisors responded that there
were already too many laws, too much bureaucracy and con
fusion and infringements of rights, and a lack of cooper
ation,

All but eight of the 39 said that local government

is the best level for land use administration, (Montana, 1974b)
In 1974, the legislature defeated a proposed .Sediment
Control Law (SB 401) which would have set up local sediment
control programs along lines similar to the Streambed
Protection Act of 1975 (26-4710 et seq, R.C.M. 1947).
(Johnson, 1977a, Montana DKHO, 1975)

Instead, SJR 52 v/as

approved, establishing a study of alternatives in statev/ide
sediment control.

A committee of the DNRC reported in 1975

that it had chosen to experiment with "local administration"
of sediment control and had applied to EPA for a grant to
test it,

(Montana I)KRC, 1975)

EPA responded with a S145»000 grant for a "first in
±hp. yiQt.-iDTi" nttfimpt at letting the conservation districts
take the lead,

Lewis and Clark County Conservation District

was selected from among volunteers to develop a pilot or
dinance, primarily because of its agricultural and physio
graphic diversity.

In its second report to the legislature

in April, 1977, the DNRC committee reported that
approval of Lewis and Clark CD's Sediment Control
Ordinance may influence the course of , . ,
planning a^r^encies by demonstrating that conservation
districts are ready and willing to accept the re
sponsibility of . . . their own programs. 24/
The ordinance, developed by an intergovernmental staff,
is worthy of study.
of

FvVPCA

It proposes to comply with the intent

and to follow the recommendation that conservation

districts assume sediment control responsibility.

And,

though its primary purpose is control of erosion, it does
8.11 that a state forest practices act would do.
Proponents claim that the ordinance, if. approved, will
mean the chance for local residents to have control over a
federal mandate.

It will provide a standard for operators

to live up to and give authority the the district to deal
with violators of that standard.

But above all it will

"not dictate land use to the landowner, but is designed
to help protect l8,nd occupiers within the district from
damage caused by accelerated soil erosion."
Fate of the ordinance
Will the proposal pass?

2^

'
Even the staff that drafted

it has no ansv.-er beyond optimism. (Johnson, 1977b)

The

principal opposition, as expected, comes from the rightwing groups who question the Gonstitutiona.lity of any land
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use planning and particularly the FtVPCA.

The drafters*

judgment is that the ordinance will have a harder time of
passage in Levi/is and Clark County than elsewhere.

If it

does pass, they speculate that it v?ill be easily and rapid
ly adopted tay other districts.
The staff plans to carry out an intensive education
and information program, with interviews and ads in the
local media, bumper stickers, leaflets and even litter
bags.

They believe that, even if the propaganda effort

fails to carry the vote, it v/ill at least serve a purpose
in making the people aware of the existence and purpose
of conservation districts.
All other districts, says Bill Johnson of the staff,
are watching and v^aiting to see how the proposal fares.
If it does not pass, the next legislative session will make
sediment control regulation mandatory, he thinks, either
by statewide legislation or amendment of the Conservation
Districts Lav; to require Sediment Control Ordinances.

In

effect, if landowners fail to take this chance, regulation
will be imposed on them whether they like it or not.
The attempt, Johnson claims, is to let the problems
be solved by neighbors instead of the government.
will conservation districts do this effectively?

26

But
Indiv

idual district ordinances would, besides adding administracnat^s ^ require manpower for preparing conservation
plans, approving forest operations and providing expertise
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where the local districts fall short, e.g. in soil analysis,
fisheries and disease control.

The estimate is that, even

ascuming that all 59 districts pass ordinances — that no
gaps exist — the costs of manpower to the Divi^iion of
Forestry would double, compared to statev;ide administration,
and overall costs would increase 2-| times. (Lukes, 1977b)
If local control becomes a viable and effective means of
involving and edvicating local landowners in the maintenence
and use of their forest land resource, the costs will be
worth the effort.
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LEWIS AMD CL/IRK COUNTY CONSERVATION DISTRICT SEDIMENT
CONTROL ORDINANCE (#77-01 as proposed 4-15-77)
1)

TITLE:

Lewis and Clark ('ounty Conservation District

Sediment Control Ordinance, as aiithorized by
I.'Iontrana law.
2)

POLICY:

Control and prevent accelerated soil erosion.

3)

PIJjJPOuE;

A comprehensive program villi use land up to

its capabilities, prevent degradation of resources
and oromote the general welfare.
4)
. 5)

DEPIHITIONS:

Uoderate.

CONS..RVATION STANDARDS:

Minimum standards shall be

those set by the SCS for erosion control and the
State Forestry Committee for timber harvesting, but
nay be repealed or amended by the svipervisors,
6)

AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES;

7)

FORESTRY ACTIVITIES;

(not applicable)

Any land occupier operating in

accordance with district-approved v/oodlot conserva
tion plan complies with regulations.

Those without

plan must submit notice of proposed operations to
the district, whose supervisors may require review
of the proposal by a team.

Team will make on-site

inspection to determine whether plan is necessary.
8)

CONSTRUCTION/SUBDIVISION ACTIVITIES;

9)

EMERGENCY L.IND MANAGEHENT ACTIVITIES;

(not applicable)
Practices in

response to natural emergencies heed no prior ap
proval.
10)

COMPLAINTS;

Five days allowed for notice.
Land occtipiers, the supervisors or gov

ernment officials may file complaint alleging
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ACTION INITIATED BY COHPLAINTrf:

Supervisors determine

by investigation with land occupier and complainant
whether violation actually exists.

If so, the

supervisors and violator will try to work out voluntarj)' corrective measures.
BOARD 0? ADJlJyTr'IljWT:

Three member Board of Adjustment

(appeals board) appointed by DIIRG.
APPEAL TO BOARD OP ADJUSTMENT:

Land occupiers may

appeal decision of supervisors to the board, which
has authority to grant variances.

The supervisors

may appeal a board decision to district court.
ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST OPERATIONS:

Supervisors

may issue order to violators to cea,se operations,
COMPLIANCE vriTII OTIGiR LAWS:

Approval by district

• V does not preclude compliance with other laws,
PENALTY:

Misdemeanor, punishable by fine,

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE:

Because of additional costs

imposed on land occupier by good conservation prac
tices, district supervisors may assist him in
finding public funding.

Lack of ava.ilable fimds

is possible justification for variance.
LIABILITY:

Approval of plan does not remove land

occupier from liability nor place liability on
district for subsequent damage to private propertj''.
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Notes:
1.

This is an argwAent favoring federal over state, too.

2.

Most federal proposals, such as the draft bill, now
focus on the federal government as a source of assis
tance rather than control. Albeit, one commentator
has proposed a federal forest practice act with reg
ulations by Ex'A. and mandatory state compliance.
(Johnson, 1975)

3.

Some counties had forest practice controls as early
as 1937. But in 1956, the Attorney General rialed
that the power to regulate forest practices, except
for fire control, rested exclusively with the state.
And a 1957 amendment to the Act made it official.
In 1970, the Act was amended to give three counties
regulatory power. The nev/ law now gives- all counties
this power (s.45l6). (Arvola, 1970)

4.

"Much has been made of the considerable land use
planning authority that has been quiet'ly amassed by
. . . EPA. National laws governing air quality,
water quality, solid waste disposal, noise pollution
and transportation have authorized broad powers over
land uses." Healy, 1976. P. 148-9.

5.

One other provision of FiVPCA narrowly avoided affecting
forest management. Section 404 of the Act gave the
Corps of Engineers authority to regulate by permit
"the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigible waters at specified disposal sites." Sub
sequent Gort)S regulations excluded forest management
activities (except some aspects of road building)
from the permit process. The National Forest Products
Association relievedly stated that a permit program
would ha.ve discouraged forestry. (NPPA, 1975)

6.
7.

Agee, 1973. P. 41.
The state suffered bad damage to timberlands in two
major floods in the early 60's. Some blamed poor
forest practices. The agitation for a Redwood National
Park increased and rode the swell of the environmental
movement in the late 60's. And local govermnents were
lobbying for more power, (see note 3» above)

8.

The Ba?/"side Timber case, see p. 28.

9.

In the Eastern District, operators could not cut
Ponderosa.pine (P, ponderosa) under 16 inches in
diameter. Operators, by lav/, had to post a ^24 bond
to ensure regeneration within five years. (PAPTE, 1973)

io".

Siegarr^^974.

P. 210.
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11.

The Act v?as passed in 1974 and added to in 1975.

12.

Schroeder, 1972,

13.

Forest practice regulations require multi-af^ency in
spections of some operations, but instances have de
creased steadily since 1972 — attributed to increased
expertise in the State Forester's office, (Oregon, 1977)

14.

Tlie bill, introduced at the request of Forestry for
Oregon's Tomorrow, apparently is aimed at reducing
perceived industry domination of forest policy. But
some question v.'hether this theory is wise or even
valid. (Oregon C. of G., 1977b) As one commentator
pointed out, v/hy shouldn't persons with a direct in
terest be on the boards, when the policy they make
8,ffects their own (private) lands? (Klemperer, 1971)

15.

The law did not specifically require inspections.

16.

The 1937 legislation applied to all areas over five
acres in size and imposed a $50 fine for each acre
left y/ithout seed trees. (PAPTE, 1973)

17.

Of Wiarada and Thompson Falls, respectively. The
latter y/as not elected until last year, but had been
quite vocal before,

18.

The proposal also would have amended our Hazard Reduc
tion Law, by correcting antiquated and conflicting
language and shifting responsibility for slash disposal
from the State to the operator. Because of the bill,
increased public awareness of the problem resulted in
the rev/riting of the law,

19.

An EQC survey of these two groups showed an overwhelming
concern for preservation of the agricultural land base.
' Only 11 of 39 supervisors failed to mark it number one.
Many in both groups expressed frustration with upper
level red tape; many purposely failed to enforce laws
and regulations for this reason..(Montana, 1974a)

P. 3.

20.
21.

Barlowe, 1953, P. 477,
HB 110, 811 pages before amendments, would have re
built the local government code of R.C.M, One of its
effects would have been to liberalize county legisla
tive powers. The bill died an agonizing death.

22.

Barlowe, 1958, p. 513.

23.

Montana, 1972.

24.
25.

Montana, 1977. P. 9.
from the Introduction accompanying the proposal.

26.

State officials are divided on the question. (Bergmeier)

P. 137.

PAE'I III

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Each of the a.cts or proposals that I reviewed in Part
II has individually unique features to cope with the special
problems it addresses.

Since this study is concerned with

the appropriateness of a law for Montana, the purpose of
Part III is to focus on these alternatives, and their accepta,bility in the l;:ontana milieu,
study shows that all the proposals except the
Conservation Bistrict's Ordina.nce fall into two general
catef^ories.
explicit:

"California Glass" laws^ are generally more

California's, V/ashinfrton* s and the EPA model.

"Orefron Class" la'.vs are not as restrictive: Oregon's,
Idaho's and Montana's bill.

But each offering has major

and minor variations of its own.
To let the reader compare for himself the alterna
tives, I will present a tabularized outline of the options
in each provision.

Recommendations are included, also, as

to which, if any, alternative fits the political and ecological climate in T.Tontana.
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CHAPTER NINE
STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PURPOSE, DEFINITIONS

EPA' s
Model

Comprehensive; includes consideration of
every conceivable resource and benefit.
Creates a comprehensive regulatory system.

CALIFORNIA' S
Law

Extensive consideration of all forest
resources while maintaining timber pro
ductivity.

WASHINGTON's
Law

Viable timber industry must be compatible
v/ith sound natural resource management.
Need for system of regulation to do so.

OREGON • s
Law

IDAHO•s
Law

MONTANA's

Encourage forest practices that enhance
social, economic benefits v/hile assuring
continuous growing and harvesting of trees.
Encourage forest practices that enhance
social, economic benefits while assuring
continuous growing and harvesting of trees.
Encourage forest practices that enhance
social, economic benefits while assuring

1975 Bill

continuous growing and harvesting of trees.
Create a program to conserve soil and

LEWIS & CLARK
CD Ordinance

water resources and prevent accelerated
soil erosion.
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A statement of policy is the guide to any lav/.

It

sets forth the motivations of the state and the standards
for the rest of the lav^' meet.
step to lav/-buildinc;.

It is the necessary first

It should, in fact, he v/ell in mind

before the rest of the law is even conceived.
the attack on the problem;

The law is

the statement of policy is the

definition and limitation of the problem,
V/hat should be set oiit in a forest practice statement
of policy?

It depends to a great extent on our use of the

forest resource.

Timber productivity and the maintenence

of air and water quality are items that should always ap
pear,

Soil protection, recreational use, aesthetics and

scientific values are suggested at times, too,2(Francois,
1950; SAP, 1975)
The inclusion of scenic/aesthetic resources, in par
ticular, has been a point of controversy in much legislation.
In Oregon, the aesthetics provision was struck from the
list for political reasons, (Mattock, 1977)

In Wontana,

"aesthetics" provoked the response that a purely subjective
criterion could and should not appear among the objects
of rule-making,

(Montana, 1975a)

The policy statement should also reflect the objectives
of the agency which will administer the law.

The policy

of Montana's division of Forestry seems to be to encourage
the production of timber on all suitable lands to the extent that it does not harm the environment.

In this case,
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a po3_icy statement should orient the non-market resource
values only in their relation to growing timber.
The Lewis and Clark Sediment Control Ordinance (here
after referred to as "CD ordinance") has a different per
spective,

The orientation of its policy statement is

tov/ard soil protection, not timber production.
The EPA model reads as follov/s;
The legislature thus declares that it is the
policy of this state to encourage prudent and re
sponsible forest management calculated to serve
the public's need for timber and other forest pro
ducts, protection of v.'ater quality and quantity,
Vv'atershed protection, protection of soils, air,
recreational opportunities, fisheries and wildlife,
• • •
It is the purpose of this act to create and
maintain a comprehensive system of regulation and
use of all timberlands so as to assure that where
feasible the productivity of timberlands is re
stored, enhanced and maintained and to assure that
water quality and quantity, soils, watersheds, air,
recreational opportunities, wildlife and fisheries
are protected.
It is further the purpose of this act to achieve
complia-nce v/ith all applicable requirements of fed
eral and state laws v/ith respect to nonpoint sources
of pollution from forest practices.
The section states that the legislature endorses timber
production only subject to the constraints of resource pro
tection.

The list is long, and a little repetitive, b^^t

EPA favors the "clean, comprehensive statement of policy
over condensed versions."^

A Montana adaption of EPA's

policy statement would stress the economic value of timber
more, and other resources less.
California Class lav/s, such as EPA's, read much the
same,

./anhington' s reads:
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It is in the public interest for public and
private commercial forest landr; to be managed consistant with sound policies of natural resource
protection; that coincident with the ma.intenence
of a viable forest products industry, it is im
portant to afford protection to forest soils,
fisheries, wildlife, v/ater quantity and quality,
air quality, recrea/bion and scenic beauty.
The statements of the Oregon Class lav/s are also sim
ilar to each ot}ier.

Idaho's, for example, reads:

Recognizing that state and private forest
lands make a vital contrib-ation to Idaho by pro
viding jobs, products, tax base, and other social
and economic benefits ... it is the public pol
icy of this state to encourage forest practices
on these lands which m.aintain and enhance those
benefits.
. . . it is the purpose of this chapter to vest
in the Board of Land Commissioners aiithority to
adopt rules designed to assure the continuous growing
and harvesting of forest tree species and to protect
a,nd maintain the forest . . . resources.
Oregon's adds the provision that it is "essential to avoid
uncertainty and confusion" in implementing forest laws
between and among agencies, and that coordination is a goal.
The CD Ordinance, after setting out a sim.ple policy
to "provide for the conservation of soil and water resources"
states its purpose as follows;
It is the purpose of this ordinance to enact
a . . . program . . . and thereby (a) use the land
in accordance v;ith its capabilities and treat it
according to its needs; (b) prevent degradation of
lands, streams, reservoirs, and la,kes; and (c) pro
tect and promote the health, safety, environment
and general v/elfare of the people.
There is one essential difference in wording between
laws;

the California C las

pro pose "an effective and

comprehensive system of regulation and use" v/hile the

32
Oregon Class laws specifically delegate "authority to adopt
rules" to their respective administrative structures.

The

conservation district, of course, cannot delegate author
ity — they are at the bottom of the pecking order.
REG OMT,'END AT ION:
. My reviev/ of the established options shows that nearly
all of them place timber production first, and make it
subject to varj/'ing constraint.

A Montana law would not

only do this, emphasizing the economic benefit of timber,
but would go further in stating that private citizens h;ave
a right and duty to manage lands as they see fit, albeit
letting professionals (the state) demonstrate hov/ to get
the most out of management, resoi-xrce-wise.

A policy state

ment might also include Oregon's goal of simplifying and
minimizing bureaucracy.
Definitions
Every law provides definitions of the terras used in
order to clarify language or assign responsibility (e.g.
"Board," "agency").

Most forest practice laws agree on

basic definitions such as "landowner" and "timber oper
ator."

The CT) Ordinance adds a new dimension by defining

la.nd occupier in place of landowner:
. . . any person, firm, corporation, munici
pality, or other legal entity who shall hold title
to, or shall be in possession of, any lands lying
within the conservation district, whether as owner,
lessee, renter, tenant, n r otherwise ^ t h e „ t e r m —
shall include both the ovmer and occupier of the
land when they are not the same.
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California and Oregon "Class laws differ slightly over
the term "forest land."

Oregon defines it as "land for

which a primary use is growing trees,"

California includes

land "capable of" growing trees for which another use is
not already present.

The latter terra v/ould seem more ap

propriate except that few forest practices could be con
ducted on land that is not actively growing trees.

The

definition of forest land should also include the extent
of lands covered, viz. state, federal or indian.
Perhaps the most important term to specify is "forest
practice."

Host definitions list road-building, harvesting,

reforestation, use of chemicals and slash disposal. (Lukes,
1977a; V/FCA, 1975)

Montana's, for example;

Forest practice means
(a) the harvesting of forest tree species;
(b) road construction which requires the cutting
or removal of forest tree species;
(c) reforestation;
(d) the use of chemicals or fertilizer . . .
(e) the disposal of slashings.
A list such as this is very easy for administration;
one can classify practices by vAether or not they fall into
these categories.

Were it not for administrative problems,

though, ve could do better to define forest practices
ecologically rather than generically.
RECOImviEFDATION:
Forest practices shall include all activities on forest
I n -nd whinh have pfitentia.1 for a 1 terntioja—0--^--l,and or

resources.

CHAPTER TEN

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

EPA's

State forest practice Board appointed

Model

from general public, authority to make
regional rules and hear appeals.

CALIFORNIA's

State Board of forestry, with district

Law

advisory committees appointed from speci
fied areas of expertise.

WASHINGTON•s

Law

State forest practice board composed of
government officials and general public.
Appointed statewide advisory committee.

OREGON • s

Law

State Board of forestry, with regional
advisory committees made up of appointed
landowners and general public.

IDAHO's

Law

MONTANA•s

1975 Bill

Board of Land Commissioners, with state
advisory committee equally represented by
North and South districts.
Board of Natural Resources, with state
advisory committee equally represented by
East and West Districts.

LEWIS & CLARK
CD Ordinance

District supervisors may amend basic regu
lations of the SCS and state forestry
committee previously in effect.
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Forest practice laws must provide for a structure of
administration and rule-making unless rules are Written
into the law.

But any one of a number of administrative

striictures is possible.

Who is responsible for setting the

standards, and the procedure they use,.is an important
consideration.

They may be set by the legislature, by an

agency or by a professional/citizen board.
the entire state or be very localized.

They may cover

Several factors

influence the choice: the status quo, popular attitudes
and economics.
Administrative body
There seems to be consensus in the existing laws that
a single entity must make policy decisions, such as a board,
and an agency must enforce them.

In setting- policy, there

is a certain mix of technical knov;ledge and public opinion
which will produce politically and environmentally sound
decisions.
An agency has the ideal concentration of professional
personnel to make technical decisions.

If standards were

to be set by purely technical criteria, one would prefer
assigning the job to the agency.

But a single agency often

lacks the diversity of expertise required.

Ilor does it

have an institutionalized means of weighing the force of
public opinion.

The limited professional and political

scope of the p..gency may_diitar-it- from reaching a policy
which is best suited for the political and ecological times.
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A citizen bo8,rd is more visible and accountable.

If

v.e are to set standards v^hich are not purely technical but
reflect the popular will, then we mtist involve the public.
Public input can be either formal, through representation
on the board, or informal, through public hearings and
solicitations,
The best option is to create a body with just the
right proportion of expertise and public opinion repre
sented.

But the laiws and sources I have studied differ

on just what that right proportion is,
EPA's proposal reads:
members . . . shall be selected and approved on •
the basis of their e'duca-tional and professional
qualifications . . . [Thej^ shall be selected from
the general public and represent the general in
terest. , . At no time shall a majority of the
members be persons with a direct financial interest
in timberlands.
But commentators on earlier drafts favored strong represen
tation by government officials and industry on the board,
(liPA, 1975)

The SAP Task Force recommended that, while a

board should represent the general public interest, it
should reflect a "majority of expertise," (SAF, 1975)
Bruce T.Tonell of Washington advocates a board with a
broad spectrum of interests and expertise.

His state's

law reads;
(1) There is hereby created the forest practice
board of the state of Washington as an agency of
state fTOvernment cnnsi nting__frE^rflembEt^5-a^ followo
(a) the, commisioner of public lands ...
(b) the director of the department of commerce and
economic development . . .
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(c) the director of the department of agriculture,
(d) the director of the depp.rtment of ecology,
(e) an elected member of a county legislative
authority appointed by the governor . , .
(f) six members of the general public appointed
by the governor, one of v^hom shall be an
owner of not more than five hundred acres
of forest land and one of whom shall be
an independent logging contractor.
There are five represent8,tives of government interests on
the board.

And it is conceivable that the forestry pro

fession might not be represented,
Tslontana's proposal gives the DNRG the authority to
appoint a seven member advisory council to the Board of
Natural Resources^ qualified only by "experience or, edu
cation to provide advice related to forest practices,"
California sets strict limitations on members of advisory
committees:
At no time shall a majority of the members,
nor any of the members selected from the general
public, be persons with a direct personal finan
cial interest.
In Oregon, the legislature is questioning its system.
Though the law now reads "six members shall be chosen from
persons actively and principally engaged" in the forest,
products industry, (526,010)

HB 2997''^ v;ould amend that

to read "not more than four of the voting members shall
have an economic interest in the -orimary wood products
industry," removing a voting majority from the state board.
The bill would also change the composition of local boards,
froTnr^h¥~currgnir~"Trt&^^L»&&-t;han^/'^ jof the nine member
committee! shall be private landowners," to "not more than
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three . . . shall have an economic interest."^

Current

status of the "bill is unavailable,
REC0M,TEMDATI0W ;
The chief opposition to forest practice legislation
in Montana comes from small landovmers and timber oper
ators.

They protest that the government is without jus

tification appropriating their property rights.

It is

logical to conclude that a board or advisory committee
composed of local landowners would be more responsive, but
also more sympathetic, to the needs of this group.
The present Board of Natural Resources, though billed
as a citizen board, is just as far av/ay from the average
citizen as the State Forester.

Members of an administra

tive board should be visible and responsive to the commun
ity.

Local officials, such as representatives of the

conservation districts, would serve this ptirpose.
Finally, I recommend that a state official be chairman,
if only on accotint of his acqiAaintance with bureaucracy and
red tape at the state level.
Local boards
Most forest practice boards (or those that serve the
purpose) are appointed by and responsible to the governor.
In this manner, says Ayer (1973), the "ultimate responsi
bility" rests on a public, appointive board and the whole
state's interests are represented.

But policy makers a^ree

that rules cannot be made and applied statewide in all
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cases.

Because of geographical, biological and political

reasons, the state must be divided into regions.
divisions serve two functions:

These

they bring local problems

into perspective, and they allovi^ rules to address areas
of ecological similarity,
EPA's model, fdr example, reads:
Insofar as possible, the board shall group to
gether lands that have substantially similar
characteristics and that will best be served
by substantially similar regulations.
Advisory committees are usually established in each
district, as in California and Oregon.

In Montana, one

advisory committee would have been composed of "seven mem-?'
bers, three residing in the V/est forest region and three
residing in the Blast forest region, [one at large^" Montana's
setup was evidently an att empt to reduce the potential for
added bureaucracy.
The CD Ordinance gives rule-making pov;er to the local
board of supervisors.

This act v;ould reinforce a local

bureaucracy and work against the goal of smaller govern
ment.

But government would be smaller in another sense;

it would be more visible to the people,
HECOMMENijATION;
V'e are faced with a tradeoff.

Would we prefer the

added administrative costs of many, smaller governmental
entities or the possible mistreatment of local concerns by
a larger on^

Th^re ai^^T)eneTTts to both alternatives.
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Regional administration
The ideal means of regulating forest practices,
a.ccording to Elemperer (1971), is on an acre-by-acre
basis.

But the costs are prohibitive.

The alternatives

are statewide regulation or regional regulation.

If

regulation were imposed over the whole state, it would
be detrimental both politically and ecologically.

The

state should be broken down into regions for rule-making
and other administrative purposes.

Ideally, .these regions

would be based on ecological similarity.
Can regions in Montana be established on this criteria?
Montana's proposed la,w would have created two regions: east
of the divide and west of the divide.

But most of our land

area is east and most of our forest west,

A plan of this

sort, though less costly, is also too broad for Montana,
The EQC ha,s divided the state into ecological regions
for analysis and planning purposes.

The most important

forested regions are the Columbia Rockies, the Yellowstone
Rockies, the Broad Valley Rockies and the Rocky Mountain
Foreland,

These regions v/ould meet the criterion of eco

logical similarity.

And only four individual sets of reg

ulations would be required.

But there is a fatal flaw.

These regions do not correspond to political boundaries.
Their creation would involve a whole new level of admin
istration, with associated problems.

In possible anti

cipation, the LQO, in its Fourth Annual Heport, states

91
that these are only environmental regions and are by no
means to be considered 'new state districts. (l^ontana, 1975)
There is another alternative.
twelve multi-county districts.

\Ve now have in Montana

These districts v.-cre es

tablished by the .^^overnor to facilitate reiHiional admin
istration.

Re'^'-ional programs as well as the Councils of

Government (GOGs) utilize these districts.

District

bound8,ries are drawn along county lines, but at the same
time group together areas of similar physiography.

Roughly

five of them would suffice the states main timber country.
However, the Division of Forestry is not set up for these
districts; to them, it would still be a whole new system.
The final alternative is the use of the conservation
districts — purely local administration.

Local boards

have a history of participating in land use decisions,
Siegal (1974) endorses the concept, saying that in general,
local regulations developed by local boards for local
conditions have v;orked the best.

However, one ans.lysis

of New York State's statute concluded that the program
there hs.d lost its dyng.mism partly because of local apathy,
(Harnilton, 1963)
The Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975
(26-1510) gave the conservation districts authority to
administer regi,ilations governing that aspect of land use.
Some districts took some initiative; others simply adopted
the minimums prescribed by DImRC ,

In most districts.

administration of the act nearly tripled the workload,
(Johnson, 1977b)

If districts were to adopt the proposed

sediment control ordinance, their administrative str^^ctures
— and costs — vould expand considerably.
In a survey of land use issues conducted in 1974, at
least seven of the districts responding cited their lack of
knowledf;;e and qualifications to deal with current issues.
But they were conscious of them and prepared to do soraethinjr;.

Several respondents offered

suggestions for nev/

programs to protect special resources.

One district wanted

new regulations that would nrotect the rights of ovnership
and at the same time society's interest for future gener
ations.

The same district proposed th8,t regulation begin

with local initiative, arid that the superior financial and
organizational reso^irces of the state could then be mar
shalled against locally identified problems, (Montana,
1974a)

This indicates a. certain amount of political savvy,

RECOMliKNDATION;

"J3istrict-level a.dministration is closest to the pro
blem,

But districts often lack the time, money and re

sources to ta,ke the lead.

And when they do, it is often

with a distinct loca.1 bias.
politically sound move.
tablish

But local rule-making is a

One alternative might be to es

local rules, but enable the right of review by a

statev/ide entity such as the Board of Natural Resources,
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'•any of- the older laws, since rewritten, set standards
in the legislature.

This is still the case to some extent

in California, where legislated rules are disguised under
the term "resource conservation standards."
Amidst the rising clamor of concern about the lack of
openness and accountability in the administrative branch,
legislative standards gain some credence.

Administrative

rule-making, it is claimed, is unjust because it subverts
the rule of law; it places the decisions of one man or a
few men beyond the reach of the people.

The apparent sol

ution is to set our standards in the ha^lls of the legisl8,ture, where everybody ha.s a cha.nce to participate,
Legisls.tors are responsive to public demands.

But they

are hardly qualified to m.ake forest practice policy.
are barbers, some teachers, some pharmacists.

Some

They deal

with land use issues, business regulation, taxes and inter
state commerce.

They cannot take the time — even if they

had it — to become even routinely knowledgable about
forestry issues.
Regulation established by law is less flexible than
that created administra,tively.

New technologies and ap

proaches come into being faster than a legislature can
amend its rules.

One good example is that of t]ae National

Forest Organic Act of 1397, out of date long before
Congress even became aware of the problem.
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Rules established by the legislature would tend to be
more politically sound.

They would reflect the will of the

people to the extent that the legislature does..

But the

politics of the legislature simply preclude a technically
sound decision, 8,s well.

The proper function of the legis

lature, says the SAP Task Force (1975), is in establishing
procedures and guidlines for regulations, not in writing
them into the law,
REC0I;?:ERDATI0N:
Montana's Legisla.ture, particuLarly restricted by time
and staffing limitations, should not retain the responsi
bility for setting and updating forest practice rules.
But it should keep a clearly established oversight re
sponsibility over actions and pronouncements of state ad
ministrators,

This need not be written into a forest prac

tice law; it should be implied in every delegation of
power.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
RULE-MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT

EPA's

Plan required for large operations, notice

Model

only for small.

Inspections as necessary.

Board may allow state to repair damage.
CALIFORNIA' S

Professionally prepared plan required.

Law

Inspections before, during and after.
Court order to stop violators and repair.

WASHINGTON's

Plan/notice/EIS varying according to poten

Law

tial for damage.
and after.

Inspections before, during

Stop work order, may make repairs.

OREGON•s

Notice of operation required.

Stop work

Law

order for violators. Board may allow
department to repair damages.

IDAHO•s

Notification or management plan required.

Law

Department may issue stop work order and
repair damages.

MONTANA•s

Notice of operation required.

1975 Bill

may issue stop work order and repair dam

Department

ages on its own.

LEWIS & CLA.RK

Operator must have conservation plan or

CD Ordinance

else notify supervisors.

"Team" inspection.

Voluntary solutions to violations stressed.
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Forest practice lav/s must include provisions designed
as guidlines for administration.

A law must state, whether

a management plan, harvesting plan or only a notice is to
be required.

It must state who will review the plans and

v/hether they have right of approval.

It may require agencies

to follow a procedure in correcting violations.

But it

must also TDrovide a clear appellate procedure.
Plan vs. notice
The administering agency must be able to' evaluate
private forestry operations.

In general, laws have re

quired either timber harvesting plans or a notice of oper
ations.

Klemperer (1971) commenting on the effectiveness

of a regul8.tory system, said we are "unable to quantify
net regional benefits in common units, but we should be
able to rank forest management plans according to preference.""^ In other words, plans are the measure of how ef
fective forest practice regulations are.
The Oregon Forest Practice Act requires that:
An operator, timber ovmer or landowner, before
commencing an operation, shall notify the State
Forester., . .
An operator . . . shall notify the State For
ester of any subsequent change.
This is the "notice" requirement;

California's re

quirement for "plans" reads:
No person shall conduct timber operations \mless
a timber harvesting plan prepared by a registered
professional forester has been submitted for such
operations to the State Forester.
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EPA's model requires the same "plan" for larger operations,
but requires only a notice for smaller ones.
There is a tradeoff between the costs to the landowner
and administrators, of harvesting plans, and the possible
loss of effectiveness by requiring only notice.

In the

state of V/ashington, a combined approach was tried.

The

law allows the board to classify forest practices according
to their potential for damage.
Class I: Minimal or specific forest practices
that have no direct potential for damaging a piiblic resource may be conducted without submitting
an application or notification;
Class II: Forest practices V7hich have a less
than ordinary potential for damaging a public re
source . . . may begin five calendar days . , ,
after written notification by the operator . . .
Class III: Forest practices other than those
contained in class I, II or IV. A class III ap
plication must be approved or disapproved by the
department within fourteen calendar da.ys.
Class IV; Forest practices ... on platted
lands , . . lands being converted to another use
... or which have a potential for substantial
impact on the environment and therefore require
an evaluation by the depa,rtment as to whether or
not a detailed statement must be prepared pur
suant to the state Environmental Policy Act.
Though the v^ording is a little confusing, it is clear
that the legislature tried to combine effectiveness with
efficiency.

But the plan has potential for turning into

an administrative nightmare,
Montana's proposal required only a notice of operation.
It also provided that:
With written approval of the department, ah
operator' may include in the notice required . . .
any or all forest practices commenced during the
calendar 7/ear,
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This provision, if applied to industry operations within
the state, woiild allow them to file a single notice cover
ing all their Montana operations.
Another a^lternative is proposed hy the CD Ordinance,
In attempting to integrate the law v/ith existing programs
and reduce costs, it provides that;
Any land occupier who has a district-approved
conservation plan which includes an erosion and
sediment control section, or any land occupier
v/ho has a long-range timber harvesting plan v^hich
includes an erosion and sediment control section
approved by the district , , , shall be deemed to
be in compliance with this ordinance.
Land occupiers without conservation or timber harvesting
plans must either agree to draft one or stibmit a written
notice of operations to the district.7
This provision could be utilized also in a state law.
The law could use either the same requirement, or could
require state-approved plans.

Neither would increase the

bureaucracy radically, since state uinit foresters presently
provide management planning service to anyone who asks.
The Idaho law — and Montana's proposal — contains
v,'hat Gary Moon (1975b) called an "excellent administrative
feature."

The provision reads:

The initial purchaser of forest tree species
v/hich have been harvested from forest lands . . .
must receive and keep on file a copy of the notice
. . . relating to the harvesting practice. Such
notice shall be available for inspection upon
request by the department at all reasonable times.
Such a provision increases the costs of public and private
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administration.
tiveness?

Does it pay for itself in increased effec

The apparent objective was to let the industry

itself police the fcyppo logger,
RECOMW^EHDATIOK:
Over the short run, the best regulatory strategy for
Montana is a simple notice requirement.
operations does not assure good forestry.

But a notice of
Over the long

haul, an overall management plan provides good forestrj'- and
a better future.

If managers could see the advantage in

it — a provision in the law that operations v/ith longrange managem.ent plans need not file notices — they

Vv 'ould

support such an option.
Approvals

Receipt of notice or plan triggers one of two options
by the administering agency.

In the California Class laws,

the agency must approve or reject the ha,rvesting plans.
In the Oregon Class laws, no action by the agency is pro
vided for,
'Which option is preferable?

Prom the standpoint of

foresters, the plan or notice should be seen by profession
als somewhere along the route.

If the plan has been pre

pared by a professional, as in California, it would mean
u-nnecessary duplication of effort for foresters in the
government to review it.

But if the notice or plan is a

spontaneous creation of the operator, it should be checked.
But none of the lav/s work this way.

Those that have less
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stringent notification requirements also require less
administrative a.pproval.
Prom the burea-ucrat' s point of view, the administrative
burden would increase substantially with the higher level
of action called for.

They may view increased responsi

bility with relish or dread.

If there is adequate funding,

bureaucrats seldom ba.lk at taking on new powers.

The SAP Task Force (1975) recommends that administra
tive procedures should not act to inhibit, or "overmanage"
the landowner's plans.

Administration should be invisible

to the good manager, biit stop the bad one.
then, is a consideration.

Efficiency,

R^^les which require extensive

delays or axiproval v/here potential for damage is small,

work to the operator's disadvantage.
RECOT'lVIioNLATION;
For operations which are insignificant or acceptable,
there should "be no delays caused by administrative require
ments.

But administrative officers should have clear re

sponsibility — written into the law if necessary — to
halt or prevent an operation on the basis of the notice
or plan filed, if it shows the operation to be damaging.
Insipections
Inspections provide the next step in enforcement of
forest practice regulations.

Hov; raa,ny are warranted, how

often held and how intensive should they be?
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The lav/s

vv 'hich

require strict reviev*; of operations

also require more inspections.

California.'s la.w requires

inspections before, during and after the operations.
does Washington's.

So

The EPA proposal requires only that

"the director shall make such inspections as he deems nec
essary to enforce the provisions of this act."

Several

commentators on EPA's first draft recommended reducing
administrative costs by dropping a specified number of
O
required inspections, such as three. (Johnson, 1975)
Oregon's law does not require any inspections.

How

ever, the Forestry Department divides operations into high,
medium a,nd low priorities, inspecting them three, two and
one time, respectively.^ (Mattock, 1977)
Idaho's lav/ does not require inspections, either.
Jack Gillette states that inspections are done on a ran
dom basis, priorities assigned to reported violations and
areas of high damage potential,
RECOMMENDATION:
A requirement for inspections in a Montana Forest
Practice law might provoke added opposition.

But it might

also, if passed, give the agency administering the act a
legal basis for requesting added appropriations in order
to carry out inspections, which apparently they do anyway.
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The inspection may turn up violations of the law, or
violations may be reported to the agency.

A forest prac

tice act must provide a procedure to halt the violations
and correct any damage.
In most acts, depa^rtment representatives are given
the right of entry upon private land.

The provision is

probably superfluous since the department is delegated
enforcement pov/ers any^/vay.

Once it ho.s confirmed a vio

lation, the depa-rtment must take action.
The EPA model reads:
When the department determines that an oper
ator has violated this act . . , Jx"Q shall serve
a notice o"f violation upon the operator , , ,
specify [ingl the nature of the violation,
V/hen a notice of violation is served . . . the
director (a) shall issue and serve an order upon
the operator directing: that the operator cease fur
ther viola,tion . . . (b) may issue and serve an
order upon the operator , . ., directing the oper
ator to repair the damage or correct the unsat
isfactory condition.
In California, the agency must go into court:
The State Forester may bring an action to
enjoin the violation, or threatened violation,
of any provision of this chapter . , . the court
may issue a temporary restraining order, , ,
The court may , , , order the defendent to
take appropriate emergency corrective action,
authorize the State Forester to order the defen
dent to take such action, or authorize the State
Forester to take emergency action.
Thus, in California authorities must obtain a court order.
This incurs more delay and expense as v/ell as tying up the
courts.

But it also motivates both parties to seek a

voluntary solution rather than coercive action.
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Oregon's provision is almost identical to the EPA's,
calling for a mandatory stop work order and discretionary
order to repair damages.
not as rigid.

But, in oractice, the rule is

In FY76, Oregon reported only 157 violations

out of 8,760 contacts.

But there were 991, or 11,3 percent,

which required "remedial action,"

In fact, this 11,3 per

cent were violators, but the department chose to try to
achieve voluntary compliance. (Oregon, 1977)
The CD Ordinance, again, has a unique approach;
V /here

the supervisors determine that the conserva
tion standards are not being observed, they will
proceed to seek a voluntary solution to the pro
blem, using the following sequence:
1) . . . written notification to the land
occupier that an apparent violation exists . , ,
2) , , , discuss alternative solutions with
the land occupier, offer technical assistance
. . . and provide information regarding, financial
assistance.
3) , . . specify, in writing, a reasonable
length of time to complete the corrective measures.
4) . . , land occupier . . .may use other than
district assistance.
Failing these mes.sures, the conservation district may
petition the district court to stop the violation.
Repairing damage caused by Violations costs time and
money.

It requires a certain degree of legal coercion to

assign the costs of correction to the proper party.

In

every law, the department is allowed to make corrections
and collect the costs in the form of a lien against the
owner or operator.
The California Class laws allow the allow the depart
ment to correct any damages and charge the parties.

In
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Oregon and Idaho, the board must first approve the action
and expenditure.

In Oregon, the state has spent $150,000

in four years on damage repair, but no data was available
on how difficult it was to procure reimbursement.
The Idaho lav/ reads that the lien should not be placed
on the landowner unless the resources of the operator are
insufficient.

In this manner, says Gillette (1977), the

landowner is not penalized for wrongdoings by the operator.
But

E5uch

a provision wotild also not motivate a landov?ner

to take an active interest in how his land is treated.
Montana's 1973 bill contained provisions for liens to
recover damage repair costs.

As one of the chief items of

controversy, it v/as dropped from the 1975 version.

But its

absense left the department with no legal means of paying
the cost of repairs.

If the bill had p8,ssed and the sit-

lAation arisen, the Division v\rould be hesitant to move to
effectuate repairs.
REC0«MEMDATX0W:
Legal avenues to stop violations.are necessary.
they should not incur unnecessary delay and hardship,

But
A

provision to recover the state's costs of damage correction
is vital.

Its absence creates potential for an unacceptable

decline in effectiveness,
/Vippeals -process
A just and efficient appellate process to ensure fair
(and lawftil) treatment of landowners and operators must be
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provided by law.

The vvPCA Task Force (1975) recommended

that the appeals process should not direct the appellant
to the Same board or agency making the original decision.
It should comply v/ith all requirements of diie process, and
avoid or provide for the possibility of conflicts of interest.
In the EPA model, Idaho's law and Montana's bill,
aggrieved parties would appeal to a board and beyond that
to the courts.

Oregon's Legislature created a committee

of the board to hear appeals, v.'ith judicial review avail
able.

Washington has a separate appeals board, with a

lengthy set of procedures.

Hearings before the board may

be formal or informal; if appeal is taken to the courts,
informal hearings receive de novo review,

California's

legislature, apparently feeling that judicial determin-^
ation of violations in the first instance was adequate,
did not provide for appeal.
RECOMMEWDATIOK:
The simplest procedures are invariably the best from
the bureaucrats point of view.

They are also the cheapest

and easiest to understand for owners and operators.

Legal

recognition of due process and court appeal is also a good
political maneuver.

CHAPTER TWELVE
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

EPA's

Operator licenses, provision for citizen's

Model

suits, no provision for conversion.
Variance from rules allov/ed.

CALIFORNIA' S

Operator licenses, zoned timberland re

Law

quires permit for conversion.
from rules provided for.

WASHINGTON's

Board must set policy on public education

Law

and training, recommends needed research.

Variance

Conversion classified type IV practice.

OREGON's

Does not preclude conversion.

Law

IDAHO's

Does not preclude conversion.

Law

MONTANA•s

Time limit on conversions is normal amount

1975 Bill

of time allowed for reforestation.

LEVv'IS & CLARK

Supervisors may help land occupier in

CD Ordinance

seeking financial assistance.
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V/orrell (1975) v/rites that some form of forest practice
program can be designed to meet any obstacles.

Governments

have tried tax incentives, technical assistance, costshare plans and marketing aids, to name a few.

There is

a federal assistance program to meet most recognized pro
blems.

There should be a means of integrating federal,

state and local programs into a forest practice law.
The CD Ordinance makes an attempt at this;
When a land occupier is required to apply
conservation practices for the control of soil
erosion and sediment damage, as specified by the
supervisors, the supervisors may assist the land
occupier to obtain available cost-share funds
from existing sources.
The supervisors may delay the implementation deadline for
corrective action until such time as funds from federal or
state sources become available.

Through this, provision,

the district prevents costs from being a disincentive to
good ma.nagement.
A similar provision could be written into state law.
Such an inclusion may be quite effective for publicity and
political purposes.

State unit foresters already perform

these functions, but are not utilized fully.
In addition, Montana has no legal authorization to
perform CFW functions.

A legal statement of the purpose

and policy of the CFM program may serve a purpose.
Costs are the main disincentive to improved management
and increased costs one of the most serious arguments against
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a forest practice act.

Any provision serving to reduce

costs would improve the acceptability of the law.

Comments

on the EPA's model pointed out that small landowners simply
could not afford to comply with the act; they do not have
the financial resources for management practices without
outside aid, and they do not keep accurate or consistent
enough records to make good economic decisions.

In addition,

they lack knowledge of the legal requirements, and some
times they j^ist "olain forget to report. (U.S. EPA, 1975)
County commissioners in northwestern T/lontana endorse
"the concept of good forest practices." But they prefer the
incentive approach, particuls-rly the funding of state nurseries to provide more planting stock for private owners,
(intermountain Logging News, 1974)
Some laws, such as California's, require harvesting
plans designed by professionals.
cannot afford them.

Small landowners just

Wiany are cutting their woodlots only

for the emergency income; they cannot pay for professional
planning and other environmental constraints — and theyshould not if the public is receiving the benefits,

Y/riting

the law so that professionals in government do the planning,
or approve the operation, reduces the cost to the landowner
and increases his inclination to abide by the lav/.
RECOMT^^ENDATION:
The landowners and operators are paying the full costs
of regulation and the public is receiving a majority of
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the benefits.

Forest practice legislation, while not

designed as incentive legislation, could benefit fl'om
provisions clarifying assistance programs and their, re
lationship to the good management required by the act.
Variance
Some legislatures have written into law a provision
for variance from forest practice rules.

By doing this,

they are enfu^ring a degree of flexibility in enforcement.
Not all managers have the same objectives.

They may choose

to vary rotation age, harvesting practices or other stand
characteristics to fit the product they are growing.

Their

practices will differ accordingly,
Vve have two options,

V'/e may write separate regulations

for every conceivable management situation, . Or we could
allow, by law, a manager to propose certain practices he
thinks would fit his purposes.
The EPA model, in response to comment, includes a
provision for variances;
Permission to condxict forest practices in a
manner different from that required by the reg
ulations may be granted , , , upon a determination
by the director that operations conducted pursuant
to that permission will be as effective or more
effective in protecting the environment,
Cfilifornia' s Forest Practice Act allows the Board to
exempt altogether certain management practices.
The board may exempt activities limited to
the cutting or removal of trees for the purpose
of constructing or maintaining a right-of-way
for utility lines or the planting, growing.

110
nurturing, shapin^^,she8,ring, removal or
harvest of immature trees for Christmas
Trees or other ornamental purposes or minor
forest products, including fuelv.'ood.
EECOMM-.KDATIOW:
A brief statement approving the use of alternative
management practices in certain situations v/ould be an
excellent political and administrative strategy.
Conversion
The SAP Task Force (1975) recommended that every forest
practice act include a provision for conversion of land to
other uses after timber operations.

Its absence v,'ould lend

fuel to the "takings" argument.
The Oregon Class laws very simply allow conversion,
Idaho's states "this act does not preclude the conversion
of forest land to any other use,"
more involved.

California's law is

Potential converters must file an appli

cation for conversion with the board.

If the areas are

already zoned for timberland, the board can only approve
the application if:
(1) the conversion v/ould be in the public
interest; and
(2) the conversion v^^ould not have a substan
tial and unmitigated adverse affect upon
the continued timber-growing use or open
space use of other land , . ; and
(3) the soils, slopes and watershed conditions
would be suitable for the uses proposed.
The existence of an opportunity for alternative uses or
the uneconomic character of the present use are not

Ill
sufficient grounds for,approval of conversions in the law.
Strict regulations over the shifting of land uses is the
evident objective in California.
V/ashiiigton's

law simply states that a notice of oper

ations or application (depending on the Class) may specify
that a conversion is likely to take place.

The practice

then becomes Class IV, subject to a review for the need
for an EIS,
RECOM'iEHDATIOr^l;
Unplanned conversion, says the 0.3. Forest Service
(1956), "may adversely affect future timber supply."

But

restricting conversions may not be politically feasible in
Montana,

Individuals should have a right to change the use

of his land for whatever reason he chooses.

But he must

not be allowed to damage other people's property or re
sources by his action.

The solution lies in providing that

conversion may take place without restriction as long as
the landovmer still abides by all forest practice stan
dards in effect for the practices he undertakes.
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Notes;
1.

"California Class" is a term I have coined to refer to
the laws of California and Washington and the EPA model
which, as I state in the text, are inclined to be more
coercive than "Oregon Class" laws, which include the
lava's of Oregon and Idaho and Montana's bill.

2.

The policy of the Federation of Rocky Mountain States
is an example of meaningless terms: "prompt and com
plete implementation of multiple- and coordinated-use
concepts," (Lamm, 1973)

3.
4.

V^illiam B, Clothier, EPA Counsel in Johnson, 1975.
See page 49.

5»

One industry-sponsered newsletter finds nothing wrong
with the present operation. It quotes the Dean of the
OSU Forestry School as saying that he thinks industry
members on the board speed acceptance of and coopera
tion with the rules in the community. One citizen
member believes that the board needs the expectise of
the industry members to keep from being overrun by the
Forestry Department propaganda. (Oregon C.ofC,, 19774)

5.

Klemperer, 1971.

6.

EPA's opinion is that site-specific management plans
should be approved by the state' s v/ater quality agency
rather than by foresters. (Agee, 1975)

7.

Since 60 percent of the bona-fide farmers in the county
already have conservation plans, it v/ould not place an
excessive burden on these managers, but only on those
which have yet to join the program,
One person pointed out that there are over 10,000
timber operations in Oregon and Washington alone, a
figure which argues against numerous inspections,
(Johnson, 197^5)

8.

9.

10.

P, 14,

A recent progress report showed 35 percent success rate
at these goals. But much of the other 65 percent were
discretionary determinations. The operations did not
receive the full treatment because ofthe brevity of
activity a low damage T)otential or the established
reliability of the operator. (Oregon, 1977)
Wote that the Slash Disposal Law, passed in the wake
of forest practice defeat, did contain the same lien
provision — unargued. (3. 28-407, R.C.M.)

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Over the course of this study, I have made several
observations and conclusions.

These, I would like to

clarify and summarize in the following chapter.

In ad

dition, I would like to enlarge my recommendations with
practical suggestions for forest practice law..
One of the chief conclusions to "be dravm from a study
I of Montana's legislation regards its political viability.
I
II There are strong indications that political opposition is
[

based not upon the merits of any bill, but on the legalistic
philosophy they represent.

It is not the form of regula-

i

j tion that is opposed; it is the practice itself,
\

On paper, the objections look reasonable; Liens,

i scenic values, variances for Christmas Tree farms.

But

1 in the 1975 version of the bill, every objection was an-

1 swered—to the detriment of the quality—yet the opposition
did not weaken.
If this conclusion is valid this thesis, centered
around comparisons with other, similar, legislation, is
useful only as an introduction to the future where such
opposition has withered.
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In spite of such opposition, or perhaps because of
it, there are several goals toward v/hich we can work in
prescribing legislation.

The formulation of these goals

is the result of this study, and I have incorporated them
into my recommendations.
Goal ;fli

Keep it simple.

The clearer and more under

standable a piece of legislation is, the easier it will be
for legislators and landowners to judge it on its merits.
Obscure or conflicting Vi/ording and complicated procedures
serve only to frustrate the subjects of the law, increasing
negative attitudes.
On this count, Oregon Glass laws rate highly.

The

language is relatively clear and brief; the procedures 9,re
not too hard to follow.
The value of rule-making in light of this goal is not
clear.

Legislative rules tend to complicate the law, but

the alternative, administrative rules, is not nearly as
simple.

There is but one solution:

the legislature should

not make the rules itself, but should state in the lavi/ that
administrators be restricted both politically and procedur8.11y from making the process too complex.
Goal ;r2:
to a minimum.

Keep bureaucracy and administrative costs
This goal links in with the preceding one;

it has value also in the potential increases in efficiency
and effectiveness of administration.

Its political value

stems from the grov/ing popular fear of burgeoning and
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uncontrolalDle government.

The ^eduction of bureaucracy
\

I

should be a permanent policy go^l for all legislation.
Drafters should take every opportunity to tie new programs
into existing ones, eliminate useless ones and reduce the
need for interagency red tape if the benefits are not worth
the added hassle.

It y/ill pay off in political acceptance.

For forest practice legislation, satisfaction of this
goal requires working the new program into existing jobs
and administrative structure.

For instance, a requirement

for management plans would not be unjustified; state unit
foresters are set up to do this service currently.

But a

new requirement for approval, of either plans or notices,
would be less acceptable.
The administering agency, though, mtist not be restricted
in its duties.

It must be able, if it perceives a possible

violation from reviewing the notice, to act upon that in
formation, either by restraining the landovmer or conducting
a, followup inspection.

This provision was not written into

past Montana proposals.
Goal //3:
Individual.

Protect the rights and liberties of the

The choice of regulatory means to enforce

policy cannot be justified simply by noting that the "Taking
IsBue" is a red herring.

A government is what the people

want it to be; if the majority fa.vored exclusive property
rights, that is the system v.'e would have.
also attends to its minorities.

But government

Just because the group
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that advocates exclusive property rights is in the minority,
that is insufficient reason to if^nore them.
The place to put this gog,l into practice is not in the
statement of policy.

It is in the involvement of the gov

erned in their own decisions.

Throughout these recommen

dations, I have taken every opportunity to v^rite the local
citizen, logger and landowner into the process.

Local

hoards shotild h?.ve decision-making authority and, vandalizing
the "jury of ones peers" concept, should have a majority of
people who are personally involved in the questions that
will come "before it.

These boards should not act as appel

ate bodies on their own decisions; a statev;ide board is
needed.

But that, too, must be composed of persons fully

knowledgable of the techniques and practical, problems
involved.
The CD Ordinance is a good example of the use of local
law designed to get local citizens to make their own de
cisions,

The local supervisors are responsible citizens

who at the ssjae time have their livings to make from the
land.

Their decisions are likely to be biased in favor of

the local residents and economic base.

But it is the choice

of the citizens rather than administrators or political
appointees.
Goal #4:

Ensure future flexibility,

Forestry is

rapidly changing, in both scope and technology.

Not only

are there consta,ntly new technologies to replace old ones,
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there is a continuous discovery of new resources and values
that can "be gained from the woods.

Achieving this goal

means not just preferring administratively flexible stan
dards to legislated ones; it means replacing any hidebound
rule-making system v.'ith one that reflects a.ccurately the
vi?ants of the prople and the needs of the resource.
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